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THE PRIORITIZATION OF CRIMINAL OVER CIVIL 
COUNSEL AND THE DISCOUNTED DANGER  
OF PRIVATE POWER 
KATHRYN A. SABBETH
*
 
  ABSTRACT  
 This Article seeks to make two contributions to the literature on the role of counsel. 
First, it brings together civil Gideon research and recent studies of collateral consequences. 
Like criminal convictions, civil judgments result in far-reaching collateral consequences, 
and these should be included in any evaluation of the private interests that civil lawyers 
protect. Second, this Article argues that the prioritization of criminal defense counsel over 
civil counsel reflects a mistaken view of lawyers’ primary role as a shield against govern-
ment power. Lawyers also serve a vital role in checking the power of private actors. As pri-
vate actors increasingly take over public functions, their ubiquity in civic life and power over 
the lives of individuals grows, and the need to check that power deserves increased attention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright1 renewed de-
bates regarding the absence of a right to counsel in civil cases.2 Just a 
few years earlier, the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner v. Rogers 
reaffirmed the Court’s divergent approaches to the appointment of 
criminal and civil counsel.3 Although the Court had previously indi-
cated that the criminal defendant’s liberty interest was the key factor 
animating the right to counsel,4 when faced with a civil litigant pre-
senting a liberty interest, the majority shifted course and ruled that 
there would still be no bright-line guarantee of counsel in civil cases.5 
The decision to back away from physical liberty as the litmus test 
presents an opportunity to consider more carefully the values that do 
and should animate the appointment of counsel.  
                                                                                                                                       
 1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963) (recognizing the right to state-
appointed counsel for criminal defendants). 
 2. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Essential Role of the Courts in 
Delivering Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 36-37 (2013) (describing the civil 
right to counsel movement and recent advocacy); Earl Johnson Jr., 50 Years of Gideon, 47 
Years Working Toward a “Civil Gideon,” 47 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 47, 48-49 (2013). While 
recognizing that many advocates distinguish between a “civil right to counsel” and “Civil 
Gideon,” see NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, Gideon v. Wainwright and Civil 
Right to Counsel, civilrighttocounsel.org/about/criminal_and_civil_rights_to_counsel, this 
Article will use the terms interchangeably. 
 3. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011). This Article uses the term “crimi-
nal counsel” to refer to attorneys representing criminal defendants and the term “civil 
counsel” to refer to attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants in civil matters. For a discussion 
of the importance of counsel representing civil plaintiffs, see infra pp. 934-36. 
 4. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (“[I]t is the defendant’s in-
terest in personal freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
right to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to appointed counsel . . . .”); 
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (“[A]ctual imprisonment is a penalty different 
in kind . . . and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitu-
tional right to appointment of counsel.”). 
 5. The Turner majority highlighted several factors that influenced its decision. 
Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2517-19. It included three factors previously laid out in Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), as determinative of the procedural safeguards fundamental 
fairness generally requires: “(1) [T]he nature of the private interest that will be affected, (2) 
the comparative risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest with and without addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the nature and magnitude of any coun-
tervailing interest in not providing additional or substitute procedural requirement[s].” 
Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2517-18 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The Turner majority also emphasized three new factors: (1) the complexity 
of the proceeding, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (asserting that the “question [at issue] . . . in many . . . 
cases is sufficiently straightforward to warrant determination prior to providing a defend-
ant with counsel”) (punctuation omitted); (2) the identity of the opposing party and the 
absence of opposing counsel—two factors which ought to be distinguished, see infra Part 
III, but which the Turner majority blended, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (“[T]he person opposing the 
defendant at the hearing is not the government represented by counsel but the custodial 
parent unrepresented by counsel.”) (punctuation omitted); and (3) the availability of “sub-
stitute procedural safeguards” that could meet due process requirements in lieu of appoint-
ed counsel, id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). For critiques of the Court’s application 
of these factors, see sources cited infra notes 91-93. 
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 This Article examines the relative importance assigned to civil 
and criminal counsel and asks whether this assignment appropriate-
ly reflects the role of counsel in a system of justice. Although it re-
views the constitutional law framework as background, this Article 
does not propose an extension of the doctrine or articulate a new the-
ory of interpretation. Neither does it advocate specific law reform. 
This Article, instead, offers a critique of the terms of the debate. In 
particular, it critiques two elements.  
 First, it suggests that civil Gideon advocates and criminal justice 
scholars should consider the collateral consequences of civil judg-
ments. Courts and scholars have recently begun to recognize the sig-
nificance of collateral consequences of criminal convictions. This Arti-
cle highlights that civil judgments, too, result in far-reaching collat-
eral consequences. These consequences should be considered in any 
comparison of the interests that civil and criminal lawyers protect.  
 Second, it argues that the prioritization of criminal over civil 
counsel reflects a mistaken view of lawyers’ primary role as a shield 
against government power. Lawyers also serve a vital role in check-
ing the power of private actors. While previous scholarship has ar-
gued for and against a right to appointed civil counsel,6 most have 
agreed that the appointment of counsel depends on the weight of the 
private interests at stake,7 and a focal point of the discussion has 
been the comparative value of the private interests.8 This Article, 
                                                                                                                                       
 6. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 
62 FLA. L. REV. 1227 (2010); Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-
Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 991 (2012) (“Some 
exceptional civil cases may merit counsel, either because they are particularly complex or 
because they are otherwise especially important or meritorious. But these determinations 
demand case-by-case judgments, not blanket constitutional rules.”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., 
Judicial Abdication and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
325, 335 (2010); John Pollock & Michael S. Greco, Response, It’s Not Triage if the Patient 
Bleeds Out, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 40, 41-44 (2012), http://www.pennlawreview.com/ 
online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-40.pdf (critiquing case-by-case approach to appoint-
ment in civil cases); DAVID UDELL & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE: OPENING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR (2007), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48493.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., Barton & Bibas, supra note 6, at 970 (“Given the importance of the liber-
ty interest in Turner, the Court’s decision leaves little room for advocates to insist that a 
lesser liberty interest qualifies for Gideon’s protections.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 
112A (2006) [hereinafter ABA RES.], available at http://abanet.org/leadership/2006/annual/ 
onehundredtwelvea.doc (recommending counsel in adversarial proceedings regarding shel-
ter, sustenance, safety, health, and child custody). Cf. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is 
Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1354-56 (2011) (arguing that a “hard [constitutional] 
floor” for right to counsel in immigration proceedings should turn on factors of liberty and 
stigma interests as well as potential for bias). 
 8. A small literature has also tackled questions of efficiency, asking what activities 
lawyers actually perform and whether substitutes, such as paralegals or technology for pro 
se parties, would result in comparable outcomes. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. 
Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 111-
13 (collecting literature). Yet much of that literature does not address interests beyond 
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however, shifts the emphasis from the private interests at stake to 
the presence of an adversary with the potential for abuse of power. 
The doctrine on the appointment of counsel reflects not only what 
kinds of private interests we value but also concern with regard to 
the dangers posed by one adversary in particular: the State. The pri-
oritization of criminal counsel reflects a judgment that the State is 
the primary adversary that people face and that the State’s role in 
people’s lives is primarily as an adversary. Within this framework, 
the most noble, important work a lawyer can do is ward off the intru-
sions of the government.  
 Yet this Article will argue that lawyers serve an equal, if not 
greater, societal role protecting people against private actors. The 
emphasis on government power, and the prioritization of lawyers 
protecting against the State, neglects the significance of private pow-
er and the ways in which lawyers guard against its abuse. Private 
actors control access to essential goods and services as well as infor-
mation and communication mechanisms that facilitate participation 
in democratic society.9 Private entities have also taken over aspects 
of the criminal justice system, including policing and incarceration.10 
The power of these private actors, like the power of government ac-
tors, is subject to abuse when left unchecked. As private actors’ con-
trol over civil society grows,11 lawyers serve an increasingly vital role 
in checking private power.  
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the landscape of 
federal constitutional rights governing appointment of counsel. It ex-
plains how the rights for criminal defendants and civil litigants de-
veloped along different tracks, with the former defined by rules and 
the latter left to discretionary standards. In the criminal context, ap-
pointment of counsel depends on the nature and stage of proceedings. 
While nuanced, the rule provides a definite trigger for appointment. 
In contrast, in the civil context, appointment of counsel depends on a 
case-by-case assessment of costs and benefits. While criminal counsel 
has been recognized as a necessity of a functioning and legitimate 
justice system, civil counsel is treated as an added benefit to be pro-
vided if a legislature or court is so inclined.12 After excavating the 
                                                                                                                                       
individual case outcomes, such as dignitary interests, collateral consequences of proceed-
ings, or broader societal implications. See id. (arguing for definition of “effectiveness” that 
includes more than individual case outcomes). 
 9. See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 238, 252-55 and accompanying text. 
 11. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1367, 1371-73 (2003) (highlighting the “new reality of privatized government” and collect-
ing related literature). For a discussion of privatization, see infra notes 248-55 and accom-
panying text. 
 12. This Article focuses on rights recognized under the United States Constitution. 
Some state courts and legislatures have recognized and created more expansive rights 
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doctrinal underpinnings of the right to counsel, this Article sets them 
aside. It takes a step back from discussions of the right to counsel 
and explores the role that counsel serves. The main of this Article 
examines and critiques the values that underlie the prioritization of 
criminal over civil counsel.13  
 The comparative weight of the private interests at stake in crimi-
nal and civil proceedings is the most common rationale for the differ-
ence in treatment. Part II therefore compares these private interests. 
While recognizing that the importance of life and liberty is difficult to 
overstate, Part II.A builds on previous work that questions the cate-
gorical prioritization of physical liberty over all interests at stake in 
civil proceedings.  
 This Article then deepens the comparative analysis of private in-
terests by introducing new research on collateral consequences, 
which previous discussions of civil counsel have not considered. 
Growing research suggests that the civil collateral consequences of 
criminal convictions—such as exclusions from housing and employ-
ment—have been increasing in number and scope and that the im-
pact of such collateral consequences may have eclipsed that of incar-
ceration.14 Even the Supreme Court has taken note of this phenome-
non and of attorneys’ expanding obligations to advise accordingly. 
The recognition of civil collateral consequences has interesting impli-
cations for discussions of the role of civil counsel. First, to the extent 
that there is increasing recognition of the importance of counsel’s as-
sistance in dealing with civil consequences collateral to criminal pro-
ceedings, it raises the question of whether counsel’s assistance is 
equally important in proceedings that address these interests direct-
ly. That is, if persons need lawyers to negotiate the immigration, em-
                                                                                                                                       
under state constitutions, statutes, and court rules, so a litigant may have a broader right 
to counsel depending on where he or she is located. See Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State 
Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245 
(2006); Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-Counsel 
Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186 (2006); John Pollock, The Case Against Case-by-
Case: Courts Identifying Categorical Rights to Counsel in Basic Human Needs Civil Cases, 
61 DRAKE L. REV. 763, 813-15 (2013) (describing state courts finding a broad right to coun-
sel under state constitutions). For a discussion of local pilot projects expanding the right to 
counsel, see Engler, supra note 2, at 49-50.  
 13. See Engler, supra note 2, at 52 (“The right to appointed counsel must reflect our 
societal values, rights, and interests. The proper response to scarcity is not to draw artifi-
cial lines based on unstated value systems such as a presumption that a criminal case is 
always more important than a custody or eviction case, but to have an explicit conversation 
as to which types of issues or interests are most important and why, paired with careful 
analysis of what levels of intervention are necessary to protect those interests.”); John Grif-
fiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third “Model” of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE 
L.J. 359, 359-60 (1970) (“American thought about criminal procedure is confined within a 
prevailing ideology . . . [but analysis will] illustrate that our present assumptions are not 
the inevitable truths they often seem to be.”) (footnote omitted).  
 14. See infra notes 152-64, 184-85 and accompanying text.  
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ployment, or housing consequences of criminal convictions, might 
they need lawyers in immigration, employment or housing proceed-
ings? Second, and even more significantly, not only criminal convic-
tions but also civil judgments result in collateral consequences. Em-
pirical evidence suggests that civil judgments result in economic ex-
clusion and social stigma with far-reaching effects. Further research 
would be needed to make a comparative assessment of the collateral 
consequences of criminal and civil proceedings. In any case, the re-
cent emphasis on collateral consequences at least partially undercuts 
the assumption that criminal and civil cases are categorically different. 
 Part III suggests that a crucial factor animating the prioritization 
of criminal over civil counsel is a concern with checking State power. 
An imbalance of power between adversaries can undermine the func-
tionality and legitimacy of the adversarial system, and in a criminal 
proceeding, the adversary of the individual is the State. There are 
two ways to interpret the danger posed by the State in this context. 
First, pitting a prosecuting attorney against an unrepresented lay-
person necessarily creates an imbalance. Yet lawyers are routinely 
pitted against unrepresented laypersons in civil litigation as well; the 
fact that the government adversary is represented does not suffi-
ciently distinguish it from a private adversary. A second interpreta-
tion appears more robust: the concern with counter-balancing gov-
ernment power reflects a political view that such power poses unique 
dangers. Part III concludes that the prioritization of criminal over 
civil counsel reflects a view of lawyers as primarily defenders against 
government power. 
 Part IV, however, challenges the accuracy of this perspective and 
the wisdom of the prioritization. While lawyers are indeed needed to 
check government power, disproportionate emphasis on this function 
creates an incomplete portrait. It neglects other vital functions that 
lawyers serve, namely that of checking the power of private actors. 
Part IV.A highlights dynamics between private adversaries, showing 
that imbalances of power are not confined to interactions with the 
State. On the contrary, patterns of unequal relationships between 
private parties abound. As private entities increasingly take over 
public functions, the scope of their power grows. So does the need for 
lawyers to check that power. Part IV.B calls attention to the potential 
function of the State as more than a prosecutor: the State can also 
serve to provide protection and support that private individuals can-
not obtain on their own in civil society. The State can regulate power 
imbalances that would otherwise exist between private parties, and 
lawyers can play a crucial role in enforcing such regulation. 
 Part V suggests that more attention should be devoted to this role. 
Lawyers serve to balance inequalities of power not only between the 
people and the State but also between the people and other private 
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actors. Devaluation of the importance of counsel in civil cases under-
cuts the role of lawyers who check private power. Part V emphasizes 
lawyers’ participation in affirmative litigation as one means of check-
ing abuses of power and concludes with a modest recommendation to 
broaden the impact of such work. 
I.  DIVERGENT DOCTRINE ON CRIMINAL AND CIVIL COUNSEL 
 As is mentioned regularly in popular culture, criminal defendants 
unable to afford counsel will be provided with counsel at the expense 
of the State.15 This principle was first confirmed with respect to fed-
eral defendants in Johnson v. Zerbst16 and then with respect to state 
defendants in the now-famous case of Gideon v. Wainright.17 In broad 
language, the Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he right to be 
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend 
the right to be heard by counsel,”18 and “reason and reflection require 
us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice” the 
necessity of counsel for a “fair trial” is “an obvious truth.”19 This 
commitment to the necessity of criminal defense counsel is a bright-
line rule that applies even if the jail time is as short as one day.20  
 With respect to counsel for civil litigants, however, the Supreme 
Court has expressed far more ambivalence.21 It is not that counsel 
may never be appointed in civil cases but that, in federal constitu-
tional jurisprudence, there is a presumption against appointment, 
and overcoming that presumption depends on a case-by-case balanc-
ing of costs and benefits. While the provision of counsel in criminal 
matters is governed by bright-line rules, in civil cases it is left to dis-
cretionary standards, if it is addressed at all. 
                                                                                                                                       
 15. See Ronald Steiner et al., The Rise and Fall of the Miranda Warnings in Popular 
Culture, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219, 222-31 (2011). Research suggests Americans also mis-
takenly believe that civil litigants are entitled to counsel. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Will Gide-
on’s Trumpet Sound a New Melody? The Globalization of Constitutional Values and Its 
Implications for a Right to Equal Justice in Civil Cases, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 201, 
241 n.95 (2003) (collecting empirical sources); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1792 (2001). 
 16. 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). 
 17. 372 U.S. 335, 339-40, 342 (1963). 
 18. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). 
 19. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
 20. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (ruling that the right to counsel is trig-
gered by sentence of imprisonment); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (ruling 
that misdemeanor charges, with jail time of less than one year, trigger the right to ap-
pointed counsel). 
 21. See Brooke D. Coleman, Prison Is Prison, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2399, 2418 
(2013).  
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A.  Counsel for Criminal Defendants 
 In criminal cases, the cost-benefit approach to appointment of 
counsel was considered but ultimately rejected. In 1932, the Supreme 
Court in Powell v. Alabama22 found a need for the appointment of 
counsel based on the particular facts of the case.23 The Court ruled 
that “in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ 
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense be-
cause of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like,”24 ap-
pointment of counsel is a “necessary requisite of due process of law.”25 
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,26 the Court moved towards a 
bright-line approach, ruling that, pursuant to the dictates of the 
Sixth Amendment, counsel must be appointed in federal cases with-
out any case-specific inquiry.27 Noting that Mr. Johnson “conducted 
his defence [sic] about as well as the average layman usually does in 
cases of a similar nature,”28 the Court determined that the Sixth 
Amendment “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth 
that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill 
to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take 
his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experi-
enced and learned counsel.”29 The Court concluded that a federal 
court cannot “deprive an accused [defendant] of his life or liberty un-
less he has or waives the assistance of counsel.”30 
 Just four years later, however, in Betts v. Brady,31 the Court ruled 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
always mandate a bright-line rule for the appointment of counsel.32 
Mr. Betts had been indicted for robbery, and when he requested ap-
pointment of counsel, the trial judge denied the request because the 
case did not involve rape or murder.33 The Supreme Court ruled that 
the Sixth Amendment applies only in federal courts,34 and, while the 
deprivation of counsel could be found to constitute a due process vio-
lation on a case-by-case basis,35 the appointment of counsel was not 
                                                                                                                                       
 22. Powell, 287 U.S. at 45. 
 23. Id. at 71. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 461.  
 29. Id. at 462-63. 
 30. Id. at 463. 
 31. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 32. Id. at 471. 
 33. Id. at 456-57. 
 34. Id. at 461. 
 35. Id. at 462-64. 
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necessarily required of the states.36 To hold otherwise, the majority 
reasoned, “would be to impose . . . a requirement without distinction 
between criminal charges of different magnitude or in respect of 
courts of varying jurisdiction.”37 The majority explained, “The ques-
tion we are now to decide is whether due process of law demands that 
in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a State must 
furnish counsel to an indigent defendant. Is the furnishing of counsel 
in all cases whatever dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental 
principles of fairness?”38 The majority decided that it is not.39 
 Even the dissenting opinion shrank from professing an absolute 
rule.40 Although it urged a different result, it grounded its conclusion 
in the particular facts of the case.41 It highlighted that the petitioner 
was “a farm hand”42 and “a man of little education,”43 who faced 
charges of a serious crime.44 Though his dissent included broader 
language,45 Justice Black specified that he reached his conclusion “in 
view of the nature of the offense and the circumstances of his [the 
defendant’s] trial and conviction.”46 
 For two decades following Betts v. Brady, appointment of criminal 
defense counsel was provided on a bright-line basis in federal courts 
but a case-by-case basis in state courts.47 Then Gideon v. Wain-
wright48 arrived and changed the landscape. Although the Court 
found no special circumstances,49 it concluded that Mr. Gideon’s due 
                                                                                                                                       
 36. Id. at 471-72. 
 37. Id. at 473. The majority went on to state, “[A]s the Fourteenth Amendment ex-
tends the protection of due process to property as well as to life and liberty, if we hold with 
the petitioner, logic would require the furnishing of counsel in civil cases involving proper-
ty.” Id. 
 38. Id. at 464. 
 39. Id. at 473. 
 40. See id. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting) (“To hold that the petitioner had a constitu-
tional right to counsel in this case does not require us to say that no trial for any offense, or 
in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not repre-
sented by counsel. This case can be determined by a resolution of a narrower question: 
whether in view of the nature of the offense and the circumstances of his trial and convic-
tion, this petitioner was denied the procedural protection which is his right under the Fed-
eral Constitution. I think he was.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 41. Id. at 474-76. 
 42. Id. at 474. 
 43. Id.  
 44. See id. at 476. 
 45. See id. at 475-77. 
 46. Id. at 474. 
 47. The exception was where states chose to mandate appointment of counsel by stat-
ute. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (referencing different states’  
approaches). 
 48. Id. at 339. 
 49. See id. at 337 (noting that Mr. Gideon “conducted his defense about as well as 
could be expected from a layman”); see also id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The Court 
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process rights had been violated because the aid of counsel is “fun-
damental” to a “fair trial.”50 The Court held that the fairness and due 
process principles of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the 
protections of the Sixth Amendment,51 and the bright-line guarantee 
of appointed counsel did apply to the states.52 Betts v. Brady was 
overruled.53 Following Gideon, the approach to appointment of coun-
sel became more like that with which the public is familiar today: a 
bright-line guarantee.54 
 The rule governing the right to counsel operates with an automat-
ic trigger,55 and applies regardless of costs and other factors.56 The 
appointment does not turn on judicial discretion or an assessment of 
the underlying facts of the particular case. The merits of potential 
defenses will not be considered. Neither will the expense of the ap-
pointment, nor the individual defendant’s capacity to represent him-
self or herself pro se. The criminal defendant’s right to counsel has an 
“absolute” value in the sense that it necessarily outweighs any value 
on the opposite side of the ledger.  
                                                                                                                                       
has come to recognize . . . that the mere existence of a serious criminal charge constituted 
in itself special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial.”). 
 50. Id. at 343-44. 
 51. Id. at 340-41. 
 52. Id. at 342. 
 53. See id. at 343-44.  
 54. See id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The special circumstances rule has been 
formally abandoned in capital cases, and the time has now come when it should be similar-
ly abandoned in noncapital cases, at least as to offenses which, as the one involved here, 
carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence.”). 
 55. The right is triggered during custodial interrogations, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966), at preliminary hear-
ings, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970), and after formal charges have been filed, 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964). It applies on a first appeal, Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963), but not subsequent, discretionary appeals, Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974), and not for civil, post-conviction petitions. Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1989). Notably, the right is limited to cases involving impris-
onment. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979). 
 56. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 372-73 (“In Argersinger the Court rejected arguments that 
social cost or a lack of available lawyers militated against its holding . . . [and] conclu[ded] 
that incarceration was so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed as a result of a 
criminal trial unless an indigent defendant ha[s] been offered appointed counsel to assist in 
his defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit in such a rule.” (citing Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32, 33, 37 n.7, 41 (1972))). But cf. John D. King, Beyond “Life and 
Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2013) (arguing 
that judges and prosecutors have the discretion not to pursue incarceration and, therefore, 
the incarceration rule of Scott, 440 U.S. 367, allows them to undercut the right to counsel). 
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B.  Counsel for Civil Litigants 
 In civil matters there is no federal constitutional guarantee of ap-
pointed counsel.57 There is only a right to judicial consideration of 
such appointment on an individualized, case-by-case basis.58 This ap-
proach reflects the relatively lower status the Court has accorded to 
civil counsel. 
 The Supreme Court addressed the question of appointment of 
counsel for civil litigants two decades after Gideon.59 In Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services of Durham County,60 the state of North 
Carolina had threatened to permanently terminate a mother’s paren-
tal rights but appointed no attorney to represent her at the proceed-
ing where the decision would be made.61 The mother was left to de-
fend herself, and the sufficiency of her mothering, on her own.62 Ms. 
Lassiter lost the case, along with all ties to her child.63 On appeal, 
Ms. Lassiter’s advocates challenged the termination in the absence of 
counsel, presenting procedural due process arguments grounded in 
the Fourteenth Amendment.64 The majority of the Court was not  
convinced.65 
 In analyzing the right to counsel, the Lassiter majority did not ap-
ply Gideon66 or its precedent.67 Instead, the Justices looked to 
                                                                                                                                       
 57. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (“This Court has long held 
that the Sixth Amendment grants an indigent defendant the right to state-appointed coun-
sel in a criminal case . . . [b]ut the Sixth Amendment does not govern civil cases. . . . [T]he 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause allows a State to provide fewer procedural 
protections than in a criminal case.”) (citations omitted). 
 58. See id. at 2517 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); see also id. 
at 2520. The argument for counsel for civil parties has focused on the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; equal protection theories of court access have met little 
success. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1461-63 (2d ed. 1988); 
Jack B. Weinstein, The Poor’s Right to Equal Access to the Courts, 13 CONN. L. REV. 651 
(1981).  
 59. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n 
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 332-34 (1985) (ruling that statute barring attorneys’ 
fees over ten dollars for veterans seeking disability benefits did not violate veterans’ due 
process rights because cases did not necessarily require representation by counsel); Bounds 
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (“[The] right of access to the courts requires prison au-
thorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by 
providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons 
trained in the law.”). 
 60. 452 U.S. at 18. 
 61. Id. at 20-22. 
 62. See id. at 23. 
 63. Id. at 24. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 32-33. 
 66. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 67. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25. 
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Mathews v. Eldridge,68 a case concerning the termination of social 
security payments.69 Decided five years before Lassiter, Mathews had 
ruled that a person receiving social security disability payments was 
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of pay-
ments.70 The majority in Mathews had determined that “the benefit 
of an additional safeguard to the individual affected . . . and to socie-
ty in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be 
outweighed by the cost.”71  
 Unlike Gideon and related authority, which were based in broad 
principles of fundamental rights in an adversary system,72 Mathews 
approached due process as a balance between private interests and 
those of governmental institutions.73 The Mathews decision set forth 
the following three factors to determine the level of process due be-
fore the deprivation of a private interest:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.74  
 The Lassiter majority applied these Mathews factors but added a 
new twist.75 In considering the first factor, Lassiter acknowledged the 
“unique”76 importance of a “parent’s desire for and right to ‘the com-
panionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children.’ ”77 
Nonetheless, the majority ruled that the significance of that interest 
did not match the criminal defendant’s interest in physical liberty, 
and the Court added the absence of a threat to physical liberty as a 
                                                                                                                                       
 68. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 69. Id. at 323.  
 70. Id. at 349. 
 71. Id. at 348. For criticisms of the Mathews v. Eldridge approach to due process, see 
TRIBE, supra note 58, at 714-15 (describing “overtly utilitarian interest-balancing” as a 
relatively recent approach to due process and one which is at odds with core purposes of 
the clause); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administra-
tive Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 
U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 46, 47 n.61 (1976) (identifying equality and dignity as values of due 
process beyond accuracy).  
 72. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963). 
 73. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. 
 74. Id. at 335. 
 75. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-31 (1981); see id. at 42 n.9 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing distortion of Mathews test). 
 76. Id. at 27. 
 77. Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
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fourth factor, which weighed against the appointment of counsel.78 
The Court described physical liberty as an exception that translates 
the right to counsel into the right to appointed counsel.79 While due 
process might require lower courts to appoint counsel in some paren-
tal termination proceedings on a case-by-case basis, there was to be 
no absolute right. 
 After Lassiter, lower courts recognized physical liberty as the line 
in the sand.80 The Lassiter decision underscored that physical liberty 
was exceptional and suggested that no other interest would justify 
the appointment of counsel. Some advocates therefore abandoned 
federal constitutional arguments, turning instead to state constitu-
tions or state legislatures for recognition of a right to appointed coun-
sel in civil cases.81 Others accepted the physical liberty distinction of 
Lassiter but used it affirmatively, drawing attention to civil cases 
with a physical liberty interest at stake.82 
 This latter argument was tested in the Supreme Court in 2011.83 
Turner v. Rogers involved a father ordered to pay child support and 
then found guilty of civil contempt after he failed to pay.84 The lower 
court sentenced Mr. Turner to a jail term of one year.85 On appeal 
from the contempt order, he argued that the denial of appointed 
counsel at the contempt hearing violated his right to due process.86  
 The majority ruled in his favor, but not on the grounds some advo-
cates had hoped.87 In spite of the liberty interest at stake, the Court 
applied the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, and it refused to 
                                                                                                                                       
 78. See id. at 30-31. 
 79. See id. at 25. 
 80. See Pollock, supra note 12, at 765 n.5 (collecting court decisions that interpreted 
Lassiter to create a presumption for appointment in cases involving a threat to physical  
liberty).  
 81. A number of these efforts were successful, and the majority of states now provide 
counsel to indigent parents facing parental termination proceedings. See supra note 12 and 
sources cited therein. More recently, a number of states and localities have begun pilot 
projects, broadening the provision of counsel to other categories of cases. See Engler, supra 
note 2, at 49-50 (describing pilot projects). 
 82. See, e.g., Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Coun-
sel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 134-35, 138-40 (2008).  
 83. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).  
 84. Id. at 2513. 
 85. Id. Mr. Turner served this one-year term in its entirety, and that was only the 
latest in a string of six civil contempt findings due to failures to pay the same child support 
order. Id. at 2513-14. Three of the previous orders resulted in prison sentences, two for 
several days each because he was released after paying, and another for six months, which 
he served in full. Id. By the time the Supreme Court issued its decision related to his addi-
tional, one-year incarceration, Mr. Turner had been found guilty of civil contempt a sev-
enth time, had served an additional six months in prison, and was scheduled to appear for 
an eighth contempt hearing. Id. at 2515. 
 86. See id. at 2514. 
 87. Id. at 2512. 
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issue any bright-line rule for the appointment of counsel in civil cas-
es.88 The decision interpreted Lassiter not as mandating appointment 
of counsel where liberty is at stake, but merely indicating that the 
absence of a liberty interest creates a presumption against appoint-
ment.89 The Turner majority also injected the analysis of the right to 
civil counsel with new considerations, all of which, it concluded, 
weighed against a bright-line rule90: (1) the question at issue was 
“sufficiently straightforward to warrant determination prior to 
providing a defendant with counsel”;91 (2) the “person opposing the 
defendant at the hearing [wa]s not the government represented by 
counsel but the custodial parent unrepresented by counsel”;92 and (3) 
“substitute procedural safeguards” were available to meet due pro-
cess requirements.93 The majority explained that its holding, denying 
a bright-line right to counsel to civil litigants facing imprisonment, 
was limited by application of these factors.94  
 Despite its refusal to recognize any guaranteed right to civil coun-
sel, the majority reversed the decision below because insufficient 
“procedural safeguards” had been made available to Mr. Turner.95 
The decision suggested that safeguards might have included: notice 
that ability to pay is a major focus of the contempt proceeding; a form 
to elicit relevant financial information; an opportunity to respond to 
questions about his financial status; an express finding by the court 
that the defendant has the ability to pay; or assistance of a “neutral 
social worker” or other appropriate layperson.96 Here, the family 
court order pursuant to which Mr. Turner was incarcerated failed 
                                                                                                                                       
 88. Id. at 2517-18.  
 89. Id. at 2516. 
 90. Id. at 2518. 
 91. Id. at 2519 (punctuation omitted). But see Laura K. Abel, Turner v. Rogers and the 
Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 805 (2012) (questioning the 
Court’s assumptions about the lack of complexity and highlighting contrary evidence in the 
record).  
 92. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (punctuation omitted). The mother of Mr. Turner’s child 
had initiated the child support proceeding, and her father pursued it at the Supreme 
Court, having later gained custody of the child. Id. at 2513, 2519. As Judith Resnik has 
highlighted, however, the government had a significant role in the case. See Judith Resnik, 
Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner 
v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 97-98 (2011) (explaining that state and federal legislation 
compelled the mother, as a recipient of welfare benefits, to pursue Mr. Rogers, and a repre-
sentative of the Department of Social Services appeared at least once in the underlying 
proceeding).  
 93. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 
(1976)). But see Abel, supra note 91 (arguing that the Court should have used empirical 
evidence to evaluate the adequacy of alternatives).  
 94. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520. 
 95. Id. at 2521. 
 96. Id. at 2519.  
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even to articulate whether he was able to pay, a basic prerequisite to 
a contempt finding.97  
 The Supreme Court’s reversal was based not on a broad right to 
counsel when liberty is at stake but on the particular inadequacies of 
the lower court’s findings.98 Not one of the nine Justices voted to rec-
ognize a bright-line right to civil counsel.99 Turner downplayed not 
only the importance of physical liberty100 but, even more, the necessi-
ty of civil counsel.101  
C.  Constitutional Mandate 
 One might argue that the divergence in approaches to civil and 
criminal counsel flows from the plain language of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Civil cases regarding the right to counsel are analyzed with the 
balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge102 because the Fourteenth 
Amendment has been interpreted as the only available Constitution-
al hook for civil litigants, while criminal defendants avoid such 
weighing of costs and benefits because they enjoy the clearer guaran-
tee of the Sixth Amendment. This argument appears plausible at 
first blush. 
 The Sixth Amendment provides:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence [sic].103 
This language refers explicitly to criminal prosecutions. The text con-
fers no right to civil parties.104  
                                                                                                                                       
 97. Id. at 2510; see also Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 638 n.9 (1988) (ruling that the 
court may not impose punishment in civil contempt proceeding where the defendant is 
unable to comply with the order). 
 98. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520. 
 99. See id. at 2520. 
 100. For a discussion of the importance of physical liberty, see infra Part II.A.  
 101. Some might reasonably argue that this is part of a broader loss of interest in the 
role of counsel, see generally Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in De-
cline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986), but recent cases demonstrate that, at least in its rheto-
ric, the Court continues to uphold the important role of criminal counsel as vital to the 
American justice system. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); Missouri v. 
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  
 102. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 103. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 104. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2516. 
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 Yet this argument overlooks an important part of how the right to 
counsel has developed. The right to counsel for criminal defendants, 
too, is dependent on and limited by the Fourteenth Amendment.105 
The authority for applying the Sixth Amendment to the states de-
pends on the Fourteenth Amendment and a determination of the 
fundamental liberties included therein.106 To make the guarantee ap-
ply equally to the states as to the federal government, a determina-
tion had to be made that it was required by due process.107  
 The reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment is especially clear for 
criminal defendants’ right to appointed counsel.108 There is no ques-
tion that the language of the Sixth Amendment guarantees some 
form of a right to counsel.109 Yet to make that promise an affirmative 
obligation, which requires the government not only to permit defend-
ants to hire counsel but also to provide it for those unable to do so, 
involves something more. The Court chose to find something more. 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainright was ground-
ed in a broad view of the role of counsel as essential to an adversarial 
system of justice.110 No consideration was given to the possibility of 
counsel in civil proceedings, so the Court did not distinguish between 
criminal and civil contexts. However, the foundation of Gideon ap-
plies equally to both. The decision emphasized the “fundamental na-
ture of the right to counsel” and that “reason and reflection” demon-
strate the necessity of appointment of lawyers in an adversary sys-
tem where the other side is represented.111  
D.  Bright-Line Rules or Discretionary Standards 
 As the foregoing review of constitutional doctrine has shown, the 
criminal defendant’s access to counsel has been governed by a set of 
bright-line rules, while the civil litigant’s access to counsel has de-
pended on weighing costs and benefits. The method of analysis that 
the Court has applied when considering the right to counsel for civil 
litigants presumes that a bright-line guarantee is not even an op-
tion.112 Balancing tests are useful in providing flexibility, but bright-
line rules serve other social goals, such as ensuring certainty and 
                                                                                                                                       
 105. See supra Part I.A. (discussing development of right to criminal defense counsel). 
 106. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-41 (1963). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
 109. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 110. 372 U.S. at 344; see also Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69 (“The right to be heard would 
be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”). 
 111. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-44. 
 112. Cf. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 49 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (“The flexibility of due process, the Court has held, requires case-by-case consideration 
of different decisionmaking contexts, not of different litigants within a given context.”). 
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constraining the whims and biases of individual actors.113 These fac-
tors do not explain why we ought to take one approach to appoint-
ment of criminal counsel and another to appointment of civil  
counsel.114  
II.  COMPARING PRIVATE INTERESTS AND INCLUDING  
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
 The traditional rationale for the categorical distinction between 
criminal and civil cases is the private interests at stake for the crimi-
nal defendant.115 The criminal charge presents the possibility of a loss 
of extraordinary social value, specifically the loss of life or physical 
liberty.116 This Part will consider whether the interests at stake for 
criminal defendants are categorically of higher value than the inter-
                                                                                                                                       
 113. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685, 1688-89 (1976). Some commentators would argue that certain rights are too 
important to be subjected to cost-benefit analysis because, by definition, their sacrifice 
fundamentally threatens the very fabric of and reason for maintaining a functioning socie-
ty. See Markowitz supra note 7, at 1351, 1354 (suggesting that Mathews-style balancing is 
“intuitively appealing” but noting that rights of criminal defendants require static rules). 
This approach, however, begs the question of what value the interests have and assumes 
that the benefits of protecting the interests necessarily exceed any costs. See MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 39-47 (1996) (describing the view of constitutional 
rights as trump cards).  
 114. One might argue that arbitrariness raises special constitutional problems in the 
criminal context, but this depends on the presumption of privileging certain constitutional 
values and does not answer the deeper question. With respect to the issue of bias, despite 
the common assumption, there is no evidence that judges are biased against criminal de-
fendants any more than against poor people generally. See Marc Galanter, Afterword: Ex-
plaining Litigation, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 347, 347-48 (1975) (highlighting how certain clas-
ses of civil parties are “repeat players” who benefit from regular interactions with the 
courts, while “one-shotters” who interact with the courts on an episodic basis are disadvan-
taged). Compare, e.g., Markowitz, supra note 7, at 1354 (“We are concerned that we cannot 
trust courts . . . to strike an optimum balance because of two types of bias: bias against 
politically disfavored criminal defendants and bias in favor of criminal justice actors (pros-
ecutors and police) who are regular collaborators with the court in the administration of 
justice.”), with Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of 
Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 540-41 (1992) (describing 
bias against poor litigants), and Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice 
Is in the Halls, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 119, 150 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) 
(describing judges’ biases against tenants and in favor of landlords).  
 115. Providing counsel when there is an extraordinary interest at stake could reflect a 
special devotion to obtaining an accurate decision in such cases, but it might also serve to 
thwart a uniquely horrendous outcome regardless of innocence or guilt. See MONROE H. 
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2-3 (1975) (suggesting that the 
purpose of the criminal trial is to protect individual rights, not to seek truth); Herbert L. 
Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1964) (describing 
“guilt-defeating doctrines” of due process model). 
 116. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979) (“[I]ncarceration [i]s so severe a 
sanction that it should not be imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indigent 
defendant ha[s] been offered appointed counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the 
cost to the States implicit in such a rule.” (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32-33, 
37, 41 (1972))). 
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ests of civil litigants.117 Although this comparison has been touched 
upon by other authors, this Article will inject into the discussion 
fresh insights drawn from research regarding collateral consequences 
of criminal and civil proceedings.118 It will suggest that this new re-
search gives us reason to question the prioritization of criminal counsel. 
A.  Liberty 
 A criminal conviction could result in a defendant’s loss of physical 
liberty or even his or her life. Scholars of constitutional law and eth-
ics often quite reasonably presume that their readers will agree on 
the significance of this loss, and they rely on it without belaboring 
the point.119 Because this Article questions the prioritization of coun-
sel for criminal defendants, and may appear to question the primacy 
of the liberty interests such counsel protect, it is necessary first to 
consider carefully why one might safely assume the importance of the 
liberty interests at stake in a criminal trial. This brief discussion will 
not attempt to do justice to the philosophical, religious, or political 
treatments of life and liberty, but merely to inform the discussion 
that follows with a reminder of the gravity of the subject at issue.  
 A person’s interest in his or her life is indeed substantial. Most 
societies consider life to be sacred.120 Its loss is unique and not cor-
rectable if an error is made.121 Many prominent scholars and activists 
have pushed for the complete abolition of the death penalty.122 The 
Supreme Court first recognized a right to appointed counsel in a cap-
ital case, perhaps in part because of an appreciation that the stakes 
for the defendant were profound.123  
 Because death is a very uncommon punishment, however, it has 
not been the primary consideration in most discussions of the right to 
counsel. Most scholars believe that the right should extend beyond 
                                                                                                                                       
 117. Economists have sought to evaluate the market value of physical liberty. See, e.g., 
David S. Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from 
the Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 750, 756, 769 (2011) (finding that 90 
days of freedom is roughly equivalent in value to $1,000).  
 118.  See Michael Pinard, Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 
460 (2010). 
 119. See Packer, supra note 115, at 16; Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advo-
cate, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 150, 156 (David Luban 
ed., 1983).  
 120. See Ronald Dworkin, Life Is Sacred. That’s the Easy Part., N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 
16, 1993, at 36. 
 121. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (“[Death] is different in both 
its severity and its finality.”). 
 122. E.g., AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
AMERICAN CONDITION 246-60 (2001). 
 123. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 46 (1932). 
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capital charges.124 The infrequency of capital punishment prevents it 
from explaining the need for counsel in the vast majority of cases. 
The remainder of this Subpart will therefore focus on the interest 
more often at stake: the loss of liberty occasioned by incarceration. 
 The importance of a loss of physical liberty is undeniable.125 Incar-
ceration necessarily involves a physical intrusion and loss of priva-
cy.126 It includes a loss of independence, autonomy, and dignity.127 It 
occasions, though not a complete loss of life, a loss of some portion of 
a life; it sacrifices the opportunity to choose where and how to occupy 
one’s days for all the time in prison.128 Additionally, given the condi-
tions of many prisons, exposure to physical and mental harms can 
fairly be recognized as likely consequences of incarceration.129 
 Yet the loss of liberty provides no clear distinction between crimi-
nal and civil cases. In immigrant removal, civil commitment, and civ-
il contempt proceedings, a loss of physical liberty is also at stake. 
Hearings regarding revocation of parole or probation violations, too, 
are classified as civil, though if the individual loses, she will go to 
prison.130 Even the Supreme Court has recognized that the civil-
criminal dichotomy is an unreliable indicator of whether liberty is at 
stake.131  
 Setting aside the doctrinal inconsistency in the application of the 
liberty rationale for the appointment of counsel, the rationale suffers 
from deeper problems. As weighty as the loss of physical liberty may 
be, it is not self-evident that this interest is more significant than all 
other interests at risk in adversary proceedings. Missing out on years 
                                                                                                                                       
 124. Cf. Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument 
From Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 818 (2004) (proposing that criminal 
defense counsel should prioritize “clients who have the most at stake or are likely to gain 
the greatest life benefit”).  
 125. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has 
always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary 
governmental action.” (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982))). For a discus-
sion of the special value of liberty, see Kaufman, supra note 82.  
 126. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 887-89 (2009). 
 127. See Jonathan Simon, Editorial, Mass Incarceration on Trial, 13 PUNISHMENT & 
SOC’Y 251, 251 (2011). 
 128. See Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: 
AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY 96 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1845904 (describing physi-
cal, psychological, and social destruction imposed by long-term incarceration). 
 129. This can include harms caused by guards, other prisoners, or the physical envi-
ronment. See Dolovich, supra note 126, at 887-89 (describing that prisons pose health and 
safety threats); id. at 887 n.21 (collecting literature on physical and sexual abuse of prisoners). 
 130. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471 (1972)). 
 131. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (ruling that juveniles must be appointed counsel 
despite civil classification of delinquency proceedings). 
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of a person’s ordinary life is undeniably significant. Yet the right to 
counsel attaches for crimes with a jail sentence as short as one day.132 
Therefore, to justify the contrast of this absolute right with the case-
by-case approach in civil matters, one must show that there is some-
thing about freedom from incarceration that is qualitatively different 
and necessarily more significant than all other interests.  
 A large literature disputes that this is possible.133 The American 
Bar Association in 2006 adopted a resolution advocating the ap-
pointment of counsel in civil matters where “basic human needs” are 
at stake.134 The resolution defined basic human needs to include five 
categories: shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and child custody.135 It 
is difficult to deny that these needs are compelling. Can we categori-
cally determine that physical liberty is more important than all of 
them?  
 Let us examine more closely the example of shelter.136 A home can 
be a place of safety and security, a retreat from the dangers and pry-
                                                                                                                                       
 132. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
133.   See Pollock & Greco, supra note 6, at 44-46 (collecting literature). When evaluating 
removal from daily life, what kind of life it is should also be considered. See JOAN C. 
TRONTO, CARING DEMOCRACY: MARKETS, EQUALITY, AND JUSTICE ix (2013) (noting that 
some liberal democracies offer “mere life”). If a person’s ordinary existence includes home-
lessness, a night in jail might take on a different character than it does for a person with a 
warm bed of his or her own. Some people deprived of shelter or healthcare would be willing 
to go to prison to obtain access to these basic needs; research demonstrates that people 
have committed crimes for this purpose. See Nicholas Kristof, Inside a Mental Hospital 
Called Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/ 
opinion/sunday/inside-a-mental-hospital-called-jail.html?_r=0 (“Some people come here to 
get medication . . . . They commit a crime to get in.” (quoting superintendent of women’s 
jail)); KESIA REEVE WITH ELAINE BATTY, CTR. FOR REG’L ECON. & SOC. RESEARCH, THE 
HIDDEN TRUTH ABOUT HOMELESSNESS (2011), available at http://www.crisis.org.uk/ 
data/files/publications/HiddenTruthAboutHomelessness_web.pdf (finding that 28% of 
homeless persons admitted committing a minor crime in the hope of being taken into cus-
tody overnight, and 20% reported avoiding bail or committing “an imprisonable offence 
with the express purpose of receiving a custodial sentence as a means of resolving their 
housing problems”). But see Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Dif-
ference It Makes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 130 (2003) (“No one who knows the slightest 
thing about criminal prosecution would choose it over civil litigation.”); id. at 131-35 (de-
scribing negative impact of imprisonment and arguing that “[t]he price of criminal pun-
ishment is unparalleled”). 
 134. ABA RES., supra note 7.  
 135. The ABA Resolution identifies the following five core interests: (1) shelter; (2) 
sustenance, defined as income from various sources including benefits from government 
agencies and wages from private employment; (3) safety; (4) access to healthcare; and (5) 
child custody and parental rights. Id. at 13. 
 136. Compare Barton & Bibas, supra note 6, at 972 (“It is far more important to fund 
appointed lawyers in serious felony cases than it is to provide them in, say, housing 
court.”), with Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their Homes in Legal Proceed-
ings Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS. J. 699, 700-01 
(2006), and Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for 
Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 564 (1988).  
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ing eyes of public spaces.137 Home can be, and is in the minds of 
many, a place to go at the end of the day, where you know your 
neighbors and they know you. Important feminist work has chal-
lenged the public-private dichotomy and revealed that, given the 
prevalence of domestic violence and child abuse, home is not actually 
safe for all.138 Yet home continues to be a place where people spend 
years of their lives, build memories, and come to define their sense of 
being.139 For many families, the home is their largest financial in-
vestment, as well as a symbol of the life they have spent working to-
wards that investment, or one that they hope to build in the future.140  
 The loss of a home is a significant displacement. Evictions often 
lead to homelessness,141 which means sleeping on public streets or in 
homeless shelters, both of which are likely to expose persons to phys-
ical and mental harms comparable to those experienced in prison, 
namely physical and sexual assault, illness, and unsanitary condi-
tions.142 Research also demonstrates that homeless persons face par-
ticular challenges in building and maintaining social and profession-
al networks.143  
 Another of the “basic human needs” identified by the American 
Bar Association is parental rights.144 Of supreme importance to al-
                                                                                                                                       
 137. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 978, 997 
(1982) (highlighting privacy interests in the home). 
 138. See Jennifer Koshan, Sounds of Silence: The Public/Private Dichotomy, Violence, 
and Aboriginal Woman, in CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 87, 88-94 (Susan B. Boyd ed., 1997) (summarizing literature and relat-
ed advocacy). 
 139. See Radin, supra note 137, at 991-92. 
 140. See TRONTO, supra note 133, at 3 (highlighting the common view of the home as 
an economic asset); Radin, supra note 137, at 972, 987 n.104; Louis S. Rulli, On the Road to 
Civil Gideon: Five Lessons from the Enactment of a Right to Counsel for Indigent Home-
owners in Federal Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 683, 712 n.126 (2011).  
 141. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY & NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, 
HOMES NOT HANDCUFFS: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES  
8 (2009), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/ 
CrimzReport_2009.pdf. 
 142. BEN ROEBUCK, INST. FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME, HOMELESSNESS, 
VICTIMIZATION, AND CRIME 15-17 (2008), available at http://homeless.samhsa.gov/ 
ResourcFiles/Homelessness,%20Victimization%20and%20Crime%20%20Knowledge% 
20and%20Actionable%20Recommendations.pdf. 
 143. See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, EMPLOYMENT AND HOMELESSNESS 1-4 
(2009), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/Employment.pdf (describ-
ing the relationship between homelessness and employment); Julia C. Torquati & Wendy 
C. Gamble, Social Resources and Psychosocial Adaptation of Homeless School Aged Chil-
dren, 10 J. SOC. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 305, 305-07 (2001).  
 144. Compare ABA RES., supra note 7, at 13 (recommending appointment where paren-
tal rights are at stake), with Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-31 (1981) 
(denying categorical right to counsel where parental rights are at stake). Since Lassiter, 
the majority of states have passed legislation providing appointed counsel whenever the 
State threatens to terminate a parental status. See Abel & Rettig, supra note 12, at 252-60 
(summarizing statutes). 
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most any parent is the relationship with his or her child.145 A termi-
nation proceeding threatens to end a parent’s legal and experienced 
relationship with the child.146 If termination occurs, the result is 
permanent and irrevocable. The result can remove a fundamental 
piece of the parent’s identity and deprive him or her of a lifetime of 
experiences with the child.147  
 Shelter and custody are just two of the interests identified by the 
ABA as important enough to necessitate the protection of counsel. 
This Article does not adopt the ABA Resolution as the only or best 
formulation of the interests that should animate the appointment of 
counsel.148 Yet this formulation demonstrates that important inter-
ests are devalued when criminal counsel is prioritized over civil 
counsel. 
 Not only does the prioritization of criminal counsel implicitly val-
ue liberty over all other interests, but, moreover, it implies a limited 
definition of liberty.149 In deportation proceedings, the outcome can 
deprive an immigrant of the freedom to pursue life in the United 
States.150 After an eviction proceeding, one can lose access to one’s 
home and be left without a private place to raise one’s family.151 To 
define the deprivation of liberty as incarceration, but not eviction or 
deportation, is to assume the priority this Article seeks to evaluate. 
B.  Collateral Consequences & Stigma 
 Advocates of a right to civil counsel have focused primarily on the 
weight of the interests at stake in civil proceedings. This Article will 
suggest that private interests are only half of the story. But first it 
fleshes out the comparative analysis by highlighting private interests 
that have not previously informed the discussion: collateral conse-
                                                                                                                                       
 145. See generally Mary Helen McNeal, Toward a “Civil Gideon” Under the Montana 
Constitution: Parental Rights as the Starting Point, 66 MONT. L. REV. 81 (2005); Michele R. 
Forte, Note, Making the Case for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary Termina-
tion of Parental Rights Proceedings, 28 NOVA L. REV. 193 (2003).  
 146. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 147. See infra note 193 and sources cited therein. 
 148. One might argue that the language of “needs” instead of “rights” frames the ap-
pointment of counsel as charity. See Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting Par-
adigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 828 (2002) (challenging the 
treatment of legal services for the poor as charity rather than rights). 
 149. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 781 (1987) (critiquing 
anti-regulatory views under which “[l]iberty [i]s reduced to limited government”); see also 
SANDEL, supra note 113, at 321 (critiquing a “voluntarist conception of freedom”). For fur-
ther discussion of the limits of this definition of liberty, see infra pp. 932-33. 
 150. See generally Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. 
Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 U.C.L.A. 
L. REV. 1461 (2011) (analyzing the constitutional status of deportation). 
 151. See Radin, supra note 137, at 991-93 (highlighting that individuals, including 
residential tenants, have liberty and autonomy interests connected to their homes). 
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quences and stigma. Collateral consequences of criminal convictions 
have recently received increased attention.152 Explorations of the role 
of defense counsel in mitigating collateral consequences offer inter-
esting lessons for civil cases, which this Part will address. Stigma is 
not generally recognized as a formal collateral consequence but is 
indeed a significant consequence of criminal conviction and will 
therefore be considered as well. A comparison of the stigma of crimi-
nal and civil judgments is overdue.  
 1.  Collateral Consequences 
 Commentators use the term “collateral consequences” to refer to 
negative civil consequences that follow a criminal conviction.153 These 
include consequences for employment, housing, education, parental 
rights, immigration status, and other civil rights and benefits. Col-
lateral consequences have expanded significantly in recent decades.154 
 As Alexandra Natapoff has highlighted, while a misdemeanor 
conviction can result in a maximum jail term of one year or less, the 
collateral consequences of such a conviction can follow a person for a 
lifetime.155 On the aggregate level, the collateral consequences of 
misdemeanor convictions exclude vast numbers of people, dispropor-
tionately poor people of color, from civil society.156 Jenny Roberts has 
suggested that “collateral consequences often overshadow the direct 
penal sentences in criminal cases.”157 Given the size of the affected 
population, the long duration, and the breadth of the social and eco-
nomic exclusion imposed, the significance of collateral consequences 
may have eclipsed that of incarceration.  
 Given the “scope, severity, and ubiquity”158 of collateral conse-
quences, John King has argued that counsel should be appointed in 
criminal cases regardless of whether incarceration is at stake.159 
Even the Supreme Court, while not embracing a right to counsel 
based on collateral consequences, has recognized the role of counsel 
in advising persons facing collateral consequences. In Padilla v. Ken-
                                                                                                                                       
 152. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 356-62 (2010); MARGARET COLGATE 
LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND 
PRACTICE (2013). 
 153. See King, supra note 56, at 2 n.2.  
 154. See Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Conse-
quences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214-15 (2010); King, supra note 56, at 24 
(describing reasons for expansion of collateral consequences). 
 155. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 113-16 (2012).  
 156. Id. at 158. 
 157. Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, 
and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 119 (2009).  
 158. King, supra note 56, at 2. 
 159. Id. at 6.  
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tucky,160 the Court ruled that misadvising a client regarding near-
certain immigration consequences of a plea constituted deficient per-
formance of counsel.161 The question of appointment was not before 
the Court, but some scholars have suggested that the decision sup-
ports extension of the right to counsel to the context of pleas.162 Nota-
bly, the function that counsel was expected to serve in that particular 
plea context was to provide advice and counsel on civil collateral 
consequences. 
 The growing recognition of the role of criminal defense counsel in 
mitigating collateral consequences carries interesting implications 
for the discussion of the role of civil counsel. If collateral consequenc-
es necessitate the assistance of counsel,163 the underlying logic sug-
gests a need for counsel in civil cases too. This is for two independent 
reasons. 
 First, if indirect consequences for civil interests trigger a need for 
counsel, events directly affecting those interests must trigger the 
same result. Categories of collateral consequences that have received 
particular attention include employment,164 housing,165 and immigra-
                                                                                                                                       
 160. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 356 (2010).  
 161. Id. at 371-75. 
 162. See Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133 (2013); 
Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650 (2013). The Supreme 
Court has begun to recognize that today’s appointed criminal defense attorney handles the 
vast majority of her cases not by presentation of a narrative at trial, but through negotia-
tion that ends in a plea agreement. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012); Mis-
souri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371. This acknowledgement 
carries an additional implication for the right to civil counsel. For decades, the majority of 
civil litigation has ended in settlement, and a great deal of civil litigation has involved 
bargaining rather than trials. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examina-
tion of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 459, 461-84 (2004) (collecting literature on the number of trials that occur in the 
U.S. per year); see also Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience, 1 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 913, 917 (2004). The newly recognized predominance of bargain-
ing in criminal defense underscores the increasing similarities in the roles performed by 
civil and criminal counsel. Compare Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 
1073-75 (1984) (describing movement away from civil litigation and towards development 
of negotiation and mediation skills), with Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372-75 (emphasizing that the 
vast majority of criminal convictions result from negotiated pleas and that “negotiation of a 
plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel”). 
 163. King, supra note 56, at 23 (“Counsel has an important but often overlooked role to 
play in making these hidden consequences known to the defendant charged with a low-
level crime.”); see also Natapoff, supra note 155, at 128 (“For this adversarial theory to 
function there are two requirements: first, counsel must be appointed, and second, counsel 
must test the government’s case.”). 
 164. See generally Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market Consequences of Incarcera-
tion, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 410 (2001) (discussing the effects of incarceration on em-
ployment opportunities post-release). 
 165. See Pinard, supra note 154, at 1214 (noting that collateral consequences can in-
clude ineligibility for “government-assisted housing”). 
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tion status.166 If the employment consequences of criminal convictions 
deserve weight, employment interests must be weighty themselves. 
Why should the employment implications of a criminal conviction 
necessitate criminal defense counsel, who could protect these inter-
ests indirectly, but not civil counsel, who could pursue them directly?167 
 Second, as an empirical matter, criminal convictions are not the 
only court decisions that routinely and predictably result in negative 
consequences: civil judgments bring their own automatic consequenc-
es for participation in civil society. Take the example of housing.168 A 
judgment of possession can disqualify a tenant from future housing 
subsidies.169 It can also mark the individual as undesirable on a na-
tionwide, privately-controlled “blacklist”170 that property owners use 
to screen potential renters.171 Like the consequences of criminal con-
victions, the collateral consequences of an eviction systematically 
block access to future shelter.  
 Sweeping still more broadly, any civil judgment will damage the 
defendant’s credit,172 and a person’s credit score in the U.S. economy 
is one of his or her most valuable possessions.173 A  
damaged score can threaten access to employment,174 housing,175  
                                                                                                                                       
 166. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356-61.  
 167. Direct pursuit could include, for example, litigation regarding unemployment ben-
efits, unpaid wages, or employment discrimination.  
 168. See Hous. Auth. v. Lamothe, 627 A.2d 367, 371 (Conn. 1993) (recognizing that the 
judgment had “potentially prejudicial collateral consequences” to the tenant); Mary Spec-
tor, Tenant Stories: Obstacles and Challenges Facing Tenants Today, 40 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 407, 415-16 (2007) (discussing collateral consequences of evictions).  
 169. 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2012); 24 CFR § 982.553 (2014). 
 170. Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to 
Protect Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1349 n.20 (2007); see id. at 1346 (noting that 
roughly 650 companies provide consolidated tenant lists). 
 171. Id. at 1356-64 (describing the tenant screening process and its deficiencies).  
 172. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, KEY DIMENSIONS AND PROCESSES IN THE U.S. 
CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEM: A REVIEW OF HOW THE NATION’S LARGEST CREDIT BUREAUS 
MANAGE CONSUMER DATA 17 (2012) [hereinafter KEY DIMENSIONS], available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_credit-reporting-white-paper.pdf; see also 
CHI CHI WU ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING 625 (8th ed. 2013) 
(describing dramatic growth in the use of credit reports). 
 173. See Earl “Butch” Graves Jr., Your Credit Score Is Your GPA for Life, BLACK 
ENTERPRISE, Oct. 2012, at 12, available at http://www.blackenterprise.com/blogs/ 
executive-memo/your-credit-score-is-your-gpa-life/ (“Even though education remains a vital 
factor in securing a life filled with options, there’s another measure that’s equally crucial: 
your credit score. Having a poor credit score can severely limit or eliminate your access to 
virtually every aspect of the American dream . . . .”). 
 174. See generally Sharon Goott Nissim, Stopping a Vicious Cycle: The Problems with 
Credit Checks in Employment and Strategies to Limit Their Use, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY  
L. & POL’Y 45 (2010) (exploring employers’ use of credit checks to evaluate potential and 
current employees). 
 175. See KEY DIMENSIONS, supra note 172, at 5 (noting the impact of credit report on 
eligibility for mortgages and rental housing). 
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education,176 transportation,177 and insurance.178 A low score can lock 
a person out of the mainstream economic market.179 It is well-
established that the use of credit scores disproportionately harms 
people of color.180 A low credit score can also threaten family ties and 
mating opportunities.181 Financial credentials influence custody de-
terminations and the right to parent one’s children.182  
 In the criminal context, Wayne Logan has suggested that informal 
collateral consequences of convictions can have equal if not greater 
effects than consequences arising by formal operation of law.183 He 
has highlighted informal effects of criminal convictions on housing, 
employment, and mental and physical health, and he has explained 
how not only the individual defendant but also third parties, includ-
ing family members, suffer from collateral consequences.184 Similar 
patterns can be seen in the civil context, where one loss can lead to 
another, sending a person into a downward spiral.185 If the threat of 
negative collateral consequences mandates a need for legal represen-
tation and protection, numerous civil matters must also require it. 
                                                                                                                                       
 176. See Credit Scores, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/creditscores.phtml (last 
visited July 24, 2015). 
 177. Credit influences access to auto loans and auto insurance. See CHI CHI WU, NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT SCORING AND INSURANCE: COSTING CONSUMERS BILLIONS 
AND PERPETUATING THE ECONOMIC RACIAL DIVIDE 4 (2007) [hereinafter INSURANCE], avail-
able at http://www.cej-online.org/NCLC_CEJ_Insurance_Scoring_Racial_Divide_0706.pdf. 
 178. See WU, INSURANCE, supra note 177, at 4-8. 
 179. See id. at 3 (“A bad credit score is a financial ‘Scarlet Letter’ ostracizing a person 
from the land of reasonably priced credit, good jobs and . . . insurance coverage.”); Shweta 
Arya et al., Anatomy of the Credit Score, 95 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 175, 175 (2013) (“In 
these days of easy access to information, a negative credit event . . . can haunt a  
consumer . . . .”). 
 180. See GEOFF SMITH & SARAH DUDA, WOODSTOCK INST., BRIDGING THE GAP: 
CREDIT SCORES AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN ILLINOIS COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 
(2010), available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ 
bridgingthegapcreditscores_sept2010_smithduda.pdf.; WU, INSURANCE, supra note 
177, at 12-17 (collecting literature on racial disparate impact of credit scoring sys-
tems); Ashlyn Aiko Nelson, Credit Scores, Race, and Residential Sorting, 29 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 39, 40 (2010).  
 181. See Arya et al., supra note 179, at 175 (noting that some dating websites limit the 
pool of potential partners for participants with low credit scores). 
 182. See Pauline Gaines, Should the Richer Parent Get Custody?, HUFFINGTON POST  
(Sep. 28, 2012, 12:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pauline-gaines/should-the-richer-
parent-_b_1905815.html. 
 183. Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1117 
(2013). 
 184. Id. at 1107-09. 
 185. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 8, at 111-12 (describing negative consequenc-
es of civil judgments, particularly for mental and physical health).  
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 2.  Stigma 
 Though not a formal collateral consequence,186 stigma is indeed a 
negative consequence of criminal conviction.187 Beyond economic and 
social ostracism, stigma may be understood to include the shame and 
guilt of moral opprobrium.188 The record of a criminal conviction has 
historically received recognition as a special marker of disgrace.189 It 
is a particular badge of a person deemed to have transgressed the 
moral code of the community.190  
 Yet stigma is not unique to criminal convictions.191 Termination of 
parental rights or a denial of custody constitutes a determination 
that one is not a fit parent; many understand this as the ultimate 
judgment of moral failure.192 A finding of civil liability for the inabil-
                                                                                                                                       
 186. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 23-26 (2013). 
 187. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (noting that criminal sanctions in-
clude the “opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction”); Rutledge v. United States, 517 
U.S. 292, 302 (1996) (pointing to the “societal stigma accompanying any criminal convic-
tion” (quoting Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985))); Packer, supra note 115, at 
16 (“The combination of stigma and loss of liberty that is embodied in the end result of the 
criminal process is viewed as being the heaviest deprivation that government can inflict on 
the individual.”). 
 188. See Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39  
J. L. & ECON. 519, 521 (1996).  
 189. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Challenges and Implications of a Systemic Social Ef-
fect Theory, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695 (2006) (“[A]s a general rule, crimes tend to convey 
an aura of reprobation not usually attributable to violations of civil duties.”); John P.  
Reed & Dale Nance, Society Perpetuates the Stigma of a Conviction, FED. PROBATION, June 
1972, at 27, 27 (“[T]he criminal may be deprived of some or most of his civil rights (called 
‘civil disability’ and sometimes ‘civil death’). . . . The convicted offender returns to the 
community sans a full status and sans his respectability. The law keeps his life in bondage 
for his past misdeeds.”). 
 190. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (noting that even a low-level 
misdemeanor “remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the per-
sons charged”); Reed & Nance, supra note 189, at 27 (“The unintended effects of registra-
tion [as a sex offender] are to broadcast his conviction and preserve his criminal stigma.”). 
 191. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980) (“It is indisputable that commitment 
to a mental hospital can engender adverse social consequences to the individual and that 
[w]hether we label this phenomena stigma or choose to call it something else . . . we recog-
nize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual.”) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 192. See S. Kielty, Similarities and Differences in the Experiences of Non-Resident 
Mothers and Non-Resident Fathers, 20 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 74, 86 (2006) (collecting 
literature suggesting that “where mothers feel unable to fulfill the duties they associate 
with motherhood . . . their moral self comes under threat as ‘good mother’ tends to be syn-
onymous with ‘good person’ ”) (internal quotation marks omitted). One commentator de-
scribed this experience of moral judgment as follows: 
When a noncustodial mother [(NCM)] tells someone that her kids do not 
live with her, she braces for the reaction. Perhaps it is silence. Perhaps there is 
a fleeting sour expression or an abrupt end to the conversation. New friends 
may back away. . . . [E]ven the best reactions are tainted by the unspoken as-
sumption that she must have done something wrong. . . . NCMs routinely expe-
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ity to pay one’s debts can also impose shame.193 Not only does the 
finding damage one’s credit and cut off avenues to the economy, but it 
also imposes a public condemnation of one’s incapacity to meet one’s 
responsibilities.194   
 Is the stigma of a criminal conviction categorically more severe  
than the stigma of unemployment195 or homelessness?196 Empirical 
research has not reached this question.197 The consequences of civil 
proceedings provide an important area for further study. In the 
meantime, a difference in the weight of the interests cannot be assumed. 
III.  IDENTITY OF ADVERSARY: THE STATE 
 While the private interests at stake cannot fully explain the di-
vergent approaches to criminal and civil counsel, another argument 
can be made based on the identity of the criminal defendant’s adver-
sary: the State.198 This Part of the Article lays out the view that the 
State is an adversary whose presence justifies appointment of coun-
                                                                                                                                       
rience harsh judgment and the assumption that they are unfit mothers. Many 
have lost friends or found new friendships cut short. Others have lost family 
members or job opportunities. Still more common are the difficult interactions 
with schools, sports teams, and medical offices. NCMs have been denied access 
to school and medical records. And they are marginalized in interactions in-
volving their children’s extracurricular activities. 
Jackie Krasas, Mothers Without Custody: Some 2 Million Women Feel the Stigma, 
VITAMINW (Mar. 23, 2012), http://vitaminw.co/society/mothers-without-custody-some-2-
million-women-feel-stigma. 
 193. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 8, at 112-13 (describing that “[s]ocial stigma 
similarly attaches to the failure to pay debts”); Arya, supra note 179, at 176 (collecting 
literature on the correlation between “trustworthiness” and credit score); WU, INSURANCE, 
supra note 177, at 4 (describing how insurers “put forth a moral person hypothesis . . . they 
argue that a person who is reckless with credit may also be reckless with driving or irre-
sponsible about maintaining a home”) (internal punctuation omitted). See generally Brent 
T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social Management of 
the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971 (2010) (suggesting that homeowners 
choose not to default to avoid the shame associated with foreclosure).  
 194. See supra note 193 and sources cited therein.  
 195. See Joel F. Handler & Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other Atti-
tudes of Welfare Recipients, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1969) (“All believed that the failure to 
earn a living was a sign of moral decay . . .”); see also Jennifer Sherman, Bend to Avoid 
Breaking: Job Loss, Gender Norms, and Family Stability in Rural America, 56 SOC. PROBS. 
599, 600 (2009) (“Job loss can have destructive effects on men’s self-esteem, with results 
that range from authoritarian stances within the family, to drinking and substance abuse, 
to domestic violence.”) (citations omitted). 
 196. See supra notes 141-43 and sources cited therein; see also Kristof, supra note 133. 
 197. Economists have studied the stigmatizing effects of criminal convictions, but I 
know of no comparable studies in the civil context. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration 
Length, Employment, and Earnings 1-3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 12003, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12003 (collecting literature on 
stigmatization resulting from criminal convictions).  
 198. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 115 (articulating the role of criminal defense 
counsel when the adversary is the State). 
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sel in criminal cases. Part III.A will explain how the disproportionate 
power of the State threatens to distort the adversarial process in the 
absence of a counterweight to even the playing field. Part III.B will 
consider whether the source of the imbalance is the mismatch be-
tween a lawyer and a pro se party but will conclude that such lawyer-
pro se mismatches systematically occur in cases between private par-
ties as well. Part III.C will entertain the possibility that government 
power is uniquely dangerous. It will identify a narrative that depicts 
the State as a dangerous entity whose power must be checked and 
will suggest that the basic reason for the prioritization of criminal 
over civil counsel is a view of lawyers as professional shields against 
government intrusion. Parts IV and V will argue, however, that this 
perspective is mistaken, and will offer a more positive interpretation 
of the lawyer’s role.  
A.  Imbalance of Adversaries  
 In a contest between the State and an unrepresented individual, 
the imbalance of power between the two parties appears stark.199 
Such a dynamic, if uncorrected, would threaten our notion of proce-
dural fairness, as well as our faith in the accuracy and legitimacy of 
the substantive outcome.200 Defense counsel must be installed, the 
argument goes, to even the playing field.  
 The State has far more power and expertise than the criminal de-
fendant to investigate and present a case.201 It has a police force to 
track down witnesses and physical evidence. Its investigators and 
forensic experts are trained in interviewing witnesses and analyzing 
evidence. The State has the power to compel witnesses to cooperate. 
Through the force of law, and with physical force, witnesses can be 
made to divulge information and potentially even provide false testi-
mony to aid the State’s position.202 These resources and dynamics 
combine to support a prosecutor’s efforts to assemble and present the 
strongest case for conviction.  
                                                                                                                                       
 199. See id. at 4-5. 
 200. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (“The purpose of the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance 
necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.”); Herring v. New York, 422 
U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (“The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that 
partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the 
guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.”); see also SANDEL, supra note 113, at 25-54 
(critiquing reliance on procedural rights and inattention to substantive outcomes); Alexan-
dra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1060 (2013) (challenging 
dependence on “the right to counsel [as] a procedural substitute for substantive underlying 
accuracy concerns”).  
 201. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1731-
36 (1993). 
 202.  See ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY 55-72 
(2014) (describing pressures on witnesses). 
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 None of these advantages is available to a defendant. If he or she 
has been arrested, the physical restraint poses a direct impediment 
on the ability to investigate. Even if free, an ordinary individual has 
no army of foot soldiers to conduct research. One might not know 
what to do with such agents if they were available. The individual 
may not appreciate which facts will be considered most relevant to a 
judge, jury, or prosecutor and which would be better to omit. A lay-
person is unlikely to understand the rules of procedure and evidence, 
let alone how best to use them in mounting a defense. One might be 
unaware of legal rights one possesses or lack the experience and 
training needed to recognize a violation of them. Should one intuit 
that some aspect of the process is improper, one might lack the skill 
to articulate and challenge the impropriety.  
 This inequality between the parties is particularly troubling in an 
adversarial system of justice like that in the United States.203 In an 
adversarial system, the development and presentation of the case is 
the responsibility of the parties. The parties conduct factual investi-
gations and legal research, and they choose how to frame the case.204 
They make claims and articulate defenses that they select. They bear 
responsibility for procedural arguments and evidentiary objections. 
Throughout, they maintain primary responsibility for identification 
and articulation of the issues that the court will address.  
 The judge and jury, in contrast, take a neutral and relatively pas-
sive role.205 The judge generally does not conduct fact-finding nor di-
rect the investigations performed by the parties. The judge may limit 
the evidence to be admitted or the time devoted to particular matters, 
but this is in the spirit of serving as an umpire and maintaining rules 
of fair play, not guiding the substance of the case. The judge may re-
quest that the parties prepare briefs on questions that require fur-
ther study, but even then the court relies on the parties to bring the 
material to the court’s attention. Judges may conduct legal research 
beyond that which the parties provide, but courts generally rule on 
                                                                                                                                       
 203. The adversarial system generally distinguishes American courts from those of 
nations that take an inquisitorial approach. For a comparison, see W. Bradley Wendel, 
Lawyers as Quasi-Public Actors 7-13 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Se-
ries, Paper No. 08-012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1024309 (comparing common law with civil law systems); see also DAVID 
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 69-77 (1988) (suggesting that compari-
son reveals flaws in the American system). 
 204. See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 26-37, 45(a)(3) (defining the rules of discovery and grant-
ing attorneys power to issue and sign subpoenas as officers of court). 
 205. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits 
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 119-20 (1974). 
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the arguments presented. If judges raise new issues sua sponte, they 
may be criticized for straying from their position of neutrality.206 
 One of the basic rationales for an adversarial system of justice is 
that a contest between opposing parties, before an impartial tribunal, 
will allow an accurate picture of events to emerge.207 Each side has 
the opportunity to test and poke holes in the theories of the other.208 
The combined effort should ferret out the truth and help the decision-
maker reach the right decision.209  
 If the State can overwhelm the criminal defendant, however, the 
defendant might not succeed in producing an effective challenge to 
the State’s perspective. The jury might hear one theory that is per-
suasive and another that is inarticulate. Without the benefit of fully-
developed presentations on both sides, the fact-finder could reach the 
wrong conclusion.210 
 The potential imbalance of adversaries is a key rationale for the 
appointment of counsel in criminal cases. Yet there are still two pos-
sible versions of this rationale. One version posits that the State is 
likely to enjoy representation by counsel, and therefore an even play-
ing field requires counsel for the individual on the other side. Anoth-
er version suggests that there is something unique about the State as 
a party such that, even beyond the mismatch between a lawyer and a 
pro se party, counsel for the State’s adversaries serves a special role. 
The next two Subparts will address these issues in turn.  
B.  Pro Se v. Lawyer  
 The potential for pairing a represented party with an unrepre-
sented party is significant in the criminal justice context. The prose-
cutor will be an attorney; the criminal defendant will usually be a 
layperson. The mismatch between a pro se party and a lawyer 
                                                                                                                                       
 206. A growing body of literature argues that judges can and should take a more active 
role to protect the rights of unrepresented parties while maintaining neutrality. See Eng-
ler, supra note 2, at 46 n.110 (collecting literature supporting the active judicial role). 
 207. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975). 
 208. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 115, at 4. 
 209. Some point out that rules of procedure and evidence block truth from reaching the 
forum. While rules based on individual rights and notions of fairness do regularly trump 
the need for truth, their presence does not necessarily disprove the role of truth as a moti-
vating factor for the design of the system. As just one example, the privilege against self-
incrimination may function to exclude a confession from court, but perhaps the underlying 
rationale, beyond a notion of due process, dignity, or the potential burden, is a concern 
about coerced confessions by innocent parties. See id. at 3-4 (describing truth as a basic 
value the adversary system is designed to serve but also identifying “higher values” that 
may occasionally supplant the search for truth). 
 210. The unjust outcome might merit special concern given the high value of the poten-
tial loss for the defendant. See supra Part II (analyzing the significance of the interests at 
stake). 
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threatens the functionality and legitimacy of the legal process and its 
results.  
 Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the routine, systemic pair-
ing of pro se parties against lawyers is not a threat unique to crimi-
nal litigation between private parties and government actors. Broad 
categories of civil litigation suffer from the same dynamic. Consum-
ers and debtors routinely appear pro se against represented adver-
saries.211 Studies of housing court show that roughly ten percent of 
tenants are represented while roughly ninety percent of landlords are 
represented.212 The vast majority of these cases involve direct and 
predictable mismatches.213  
 Such mismatches exacerbate other asymmetries in the litigation 
process. As Marc Galanter has demonstrated, certain categories of 
private actors, because of their economic position and the subject 
matter of the lawsuits in which they are involved, are “repeat play-
ers” in the courts; repeat players enjoy a variety of advantages and 
are generally more likely to be represented by sophisticated coun-
sel.214 For example, large employers, product manufacturers, and in-
surance companies are repeat players. Such repeat players hire at-
torneys as general counsel or retain outside counsel on a continuing 
basis.215 In contrast, most natural persons are not repeat players. 
Most natural persons retain counsel, if at all, on a “one-shot” basis 
when faced with particular litigation. Most natural persons cannot 
afford to retain counsel and, in civil matters, often forgo their claims 
                                                                                                                                       
 211. See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. 
REV. 639, 681 (1981) (“In the vast majority of transactions in every consumer sales or loan  
contract . . . one party is unrepresented.”); Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: 
The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 
CALIF. L. REV. 79, 118 (1997) (describing the mismatch between represented creditors and 
unrepresented debtors). 
 212. COMTY. TRAINING & RES. CTR. & CITY-WIDE TASK FORCE ON HOUS. COURT, INC., 
HOUSING COURT, EVICTIONS AND HOMELESSNESS: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL iv (1993), available at http://cwtfhc.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/pdf/donaldson.pdf. 
 213. See id.  
 214. See Galanter supra note 205, at 97-100. 
 215. See Galanter supra note 114, at 361 (“Legal professionals in the United States can 
be roughly dichotomized into those who service OSs [“one-shotters”] on an episodic basis 
and those who serve RPs [“repeat-players”] on a continuing basis.”). Notably, repeat play-
ers not only shape the common law that will govern their actions but also benefit from 
economies of scale in retaining representation. Id. at 361-62. 
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or appear pro se, mostly as defendants.216 Repeat players routinely 
fare better than “one-shotters” in courts.217 
 One-shotters and repeat players intersect on a regular basis as 
part of daily life. For example, intersections occur between: tenants 
and landlords; employees and employers; and consumers and product 
manufacturers. Disputes between such parties arise in the ordinary 
course of dealing, and such disputes end up in court with some regu-
larity.218 As a result, the occurrence of an unrepresented one-shotter 
facing off against a represented repeat player is common.219  
 The unrepresented individual facing a represented private party 
in a civil matter will be stuck in a layperson-versus-lawyer dynamic 
like that of an unrepresented criminal defendant facing a prosecutor. 
In the civil context, such dynamics systemically recreate the imbal-
ance of adversaries that the appointment of counsel in the criminal 
context sought to avoid. If, in the interest of a functional, truth-
seeking, legitimate adversary system, legal representation for one 
party necessitates representation for the other, it is unclear why this 
logic should not apply in civil matters between private parties. 
 If the mismatch between represented parties and unrepresented 
parties is not unique to the criminal context, this leaves unanswered 
the question of what makes criminal defense counsel especially im-
portant. The next Subpart will explore the view that the State is a 
uniquely dangerous adversary whose power must be checked by  
counsel. 
C.  Danger of State Power  
 Scholars have asserted that the enormity and uniqueness of the 
power of the State distinguish criminal defense from all other 
spheres of practice. As William Simon has observed, even ethicists 
who question the ideal of lawyers as neutral, zealous partisans220 
                                                                                                                                       
 216. See David C. Vladeck, In re Arons: The Plight of the “Unrich” in Obtaining Legal 
Services, in LEGAL ETHICS STORIES 255, 261, 284-86 (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban 
eds., 2006). 
 217. See Galanter, supra note 114, at 360-61 (advantages for repeat players include 
specialized expertise, economies of scale, bargaining credibility, and ability to play for rules 
instead of individual results). 
 218. See Galanter, supra note 205, at 97. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See LUBAN, supra note 203, at 62-63; William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: 
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36-37 (1978); cf. William 
H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) (arguing that 
lawyers should have ethical discretion to consider whether assisting a client would further 
justice). 
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carve out an exception for criminal defense attorneys on the theory 
that the zeal of these lawyers carries a special purpose.221  
 Part of the value placed on the role of counsel in criminal cases 
depends on the idea that government power is intrinsically danger-
ous and special steps must be taken to protect against the possibility 
of tyranny.222 David Luban has summarized the reasoning as follows: 
We want to handicap the state in its power even legitimately to 
punish us, for we believe as a matter of political theory and histor-
ical experience that if the state is not handicapped or restrained ex 
ante, our political and civil liberties are jeopardized. Power-holders 
are inevitably tempted to abuse the criminal justice system to per-
secute political opponents, and overzealous police will trample civil 
liberties in the name of crime prevention and order.223 
 Theorists have argued that, even beyond the search for truth, the 
adversary system of justice serves to protect individual dignity.224 
Criminal defense counsel serves not simply to even the playing field 
to help the court reach the right substantive outcome but also to pro-
tect the integrity of the adversary system.225 Without criminal de-
                                                                                                                                       
 221. See William H. Simon, Commentary, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 1703, 1703-04 (1993); see also LUBAN, supra note 202, at 58-66; Deborah L. Rhode, 
Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 605 (1985); Richard Wasser-
strom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 12 (1975). 
 222. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 116, 142 n.51 (1990) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL 
STUDY (1988)) (describing the importance of countering states’ power for tyranny); Grif-
fiths, supra note 13, at 363-64 (citing HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
SANCTION (1968)). 
 223. LUBAN, supra note 203, at 60. Herbert Packer offers another formulation of this 
perspective: 
[Criminal] processes . . . are in themselves coercive, restricting, and de-
meaning. Power is always subject to abuse, sometimes subtle, other times, as in 
the criminal process, open and ugly. Precisely because of its potency in subject-
ing the individual to the coercive power of the state, the criminal process must, 
on this model, be subjected to controls and safeguards that prevent it from op-
erating with maximal efficiency. According to this ideology, maximal efficiency 
means maximal tyranny. And, while no one would assert that minimal efficien-
cy means minimal tyranny, the proponents of the Due Process Model would ac-
cept with considerable equanimity a substantial diminution in the efficiency 
with which the criminal process operates in the interest of preventing official 
oppression of the individual. 
Packer, supra note 115, at 16. 
 224. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 115, at 3-4 (describing human dignity as among 
the “higher values” to which even truth-seeking may be subordinated). 
 225. Id. at 24 (“[Z]ealous and effective advocacy is essential to the adversary  
system, . . . a precious safeguard that any one of us may have occasion to call upon if we 
should come to need our own champion against a hostile world.”); Abbe Smith, Too Much 
Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of the Empathetic, Heroic 
Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1208-11 (2004) (“Defenders uphold the politi-
cal philosophy underlying the American system of justice and safeguard the dignity of each 
member of society no matter how low he or she has fallen.”).  
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fense counsel to challenge it, the State might imprison and kill citi-
zens arbitrarily.226 The danger of allowing the State to go toe to toe 
with an unrepresented defendant is that the process would be subject 
to the government’s abuse of power, and the people’s rights before, 
during, and after would be trampled.227 Particularly given that the 
State has the special power to exert legitimized force, defense counsel 
is needed to obstruct the application of that force.228 
 Of course it must be recognized that the State’s power as an ad-
versary is not limited to criminal prosecution. Termination of paren-
tal rights, eviction from public housing, and restriction of social secu-
rity income provide examples of proceedings that pit an unrepresent-
ed individual against the State. Criminal defense is not the only form 
of litigation through which people challenge the power of the State. 
Arguably, affirmative civil rights litigation presents more direct chal-
lenges to government power than does criminal defense.229 In civil 
litigation regarding police brutality, substandard prison conditions, 
and many other constitutional and statutory claims, the State is a 
party, and the aim of counsel for the individual is indistinguishable 
from that of many criminal defense attorneys: to “police the police, to 
audit the government, [and] . . . fight for fairness.”230 The criminal 
case is not unique in presenting a scenario whereby a potentially 
vulnerable individual fights the State over deeply important interests 
and counsel for that individual serves to check the State’s power.  
 Moreover, the depiction of the State as a massive behemoth is in 
some cases more mythical than real. Some government coffers are 
relatively strained.231 In white collar criminal defense, the defendant, 
rather than the prosecutor, could have the larger arsenal at his or 
her disposal.232 Securities litigation is just one field in which private 
actors’ litigation budgets dwarf that of the government agency 
charged with enforcement.233 While the cases of wealthy private de-
fendants do not involve appointment of counsel, they nonetheless il-
                                                                                                                                       
 226.  See LUBAN, supra note 203, at 60; Packer, supra note 115, at 16. 
 227. See Packer, supra note 115, at 14. 
 228. See LUBAN, supra note 203, at 62.  
 229. On the flip side, in many cases the State protects civil rights by serving as the 
prosecutor, such as when the Department of Justice or the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission initiates proceedings.  
 230. Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of 
People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 957 n.158 (2000) (citation omit-
ted); see Andrew J. Mathern, Note, Federal Civil Rights Lawsuits and Civil Gideon: A So-
lution to Disproportionate Police Force?, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 353 (2012). 
 231. See Rhode, supra note 221, at 607. 
 232. See LUBAN, supra note 203, at 65; Rhode, supra note 221, at 607.  
 233. See James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall St. Is Tossed a Bone, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/ 
budget-cuts-to-sec-reduce-its-effectiveness.html?_r=0. 
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lustrate the point that imbalances of power do not categorically favor 
the State.  
 Relatedly, inequality between adversaries is not restricted to cases 
in which the State is one of the parties. As discussed above in Part 
III.B, in particular categories of litigation between private parties, 
one side is routinely pro se while the other is routinely represented 
by counsel, and these mismatches exacerbate other asymmetries in 
the litigation process. The prioritization of criminal over civil counsel 
rests on a perceived need to counterbalance State power, but, as the 
following Part will argue, government power is not the only form of 
power that must be restrained. Private actors wield substantial pow-
er over the lives of ordinary people, and civil lawyers play a vital role 
in checking the limits of that power as well. 
IV.  PRIVATE POWER 
 Individuals often experience stark imbalances of power in their 
interactions with private actors. Private actors control access to the 
resources essential for life234—such as food, shelter, and medicine235—
and those essential for participation in democratic society—
information,236 communication,237 and, increasingly, physical safety.238 
The private actors who control this access also exercise dispropor-
tionate power in the litigation process where that access can be con-
tested.239 Part IV.A will highlight the potential dangers of private 
power. Part IV.B will then suggest that, beyond its position as prose-
cutor, the State can and does serve a vital function as a regulator of 
private power. Part V will turn to the role of lawyers as professional 
enforcers of such regulation. 
A.  Danger of Private Power 
 A sharp difference in resources can occur between two private par-
ties, and empirical evidence demonstrates that such inequality in fact 
routinely occurs in systematic and predictable ways.240 In custody 
disputes between men and women, the former tend to be wealthier, 
                                                                                                                                       
 234. See Metzger, supra note 11, at 1377-94, 1396.  
 235. See id. (describing private control over welfare, Medicare, Medicaid, and care for 
prisoners). 
 236. See Fiss, supra note 149, at 787-90 (highlighting the power of corporate media to 
shape public debate). 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE. L.J. 437 
(2005); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Mili-
tary Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879 (2004); David A. Sklansky, The Private 
Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999). 
 239. See Galanter, supra note 114, at 347-48; Galanter, supra note 205, at 95-104. 
 240. See Galanter, supra note 205, at 97. 
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and this influences the gathering of evidence and ultimate out-
comes.241 In employment disputes, where the discovery process can 
require scouring extensive records and conducting complex deposi-
tions, employers regularly outspend their adversaries, causing work-
ers to settle for relatively small sums or not to raise claims in the 
first place.242  
 To be sure, there are cases where private parties are evenly 
matched. The mismatch is not certain to occur in either the private-
private or the private-government dynamic. But there are certain 
social relationships where the mismatch is more likely than not, and 
these relationships do occur with regularity and predictability in the 
private sector.243  
 Private parties with power can also be arbitrary or abusive and 
can use their power to threaten or cajole.244 A supervisor at work, 
with control over a subordinate’s duties, hours, pay, and job security, 
can make the subordinate’s “life a living hell.”245 Landlords, too, enjoy 
power over their tenants’ lives,246 and abuse of that power occurs.247  
                                                                                                                                       
 241. See Gaines, supra note 182; Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood, in 
PARENTHOOD IN MODERN SOCIETY: LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 223, 230 (John Eekelaar & Petar Sarcevic eds., 1993); Gender Bias Study of the 
Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 764 (1990) (“Family law experts 
believe that women are unrepresented more often than men and that the outcomes they 
obtain suffer as a result.”); see also Richard L. Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession: Can 
Redistributing Lawyers’ Services Achieve Social Justice?, 1 L. & POL’Y Q. 5, 14 (1979) (argu-
ing that most litigation involving poor people cannot redistribute advantages “except, sig-
nificantly, between men and women”). 
 242. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Predis-
pute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001). 
 243. See Galanter, supra note 205, at 114.  
 244. See Metzger, supra note 11, at 1396. 
 245. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2460 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Whitten v. Fred’s Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). See id. at 2456-57 (describing how power imbalance keeps an employee 
captive during a supervisor’s harassment); id. at 2457-60 (providing examples of supervi-
sors abusing their power to alter conditions of the workplace).  
 246. See Kleysteuber, supra note 170, at 1349 (describing tenant blacklist abuse 
whereby tenant’s future ability to rent is damaged permanently based on landlord’s allega-
tion alone). The potential for abuse is exemplified in the following threatening letter sent 
by a landlord to a tenant: 
[W]e now subscribe to a service that records all filings on [eviction] actions. As 
this service is used by landlords, it will be impossible, in the future, to rent an 
apartment if you have been served a legal action. We are advising you of this, 
as the failure to pay your rent on time[] will result in your name being placed 
in the file, and you will be unable to secure any apartment in the future. 
Id. (quoting Robert W. Benson & Raymond A. Biering, Tenant Reports as an Invasion of 
Privacy: A Legislative Proposal, 12 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 301, 301 (1979)). 
 247. See, e.g., Theresa Keeley, Landlord Sexual Assault and Rape of Tenants: Survey 
Findings and Advocacy Approaches, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 441, 
442-43 (2006) (collecting empirical studies of sexual abuse by landlords); Introductory Out-
line on Sexual Harassment in Housing, NAT’L HOUS. LAW PROJECT, http://nhlp.org/node/436 
(last visited July 24, 2015) (“Due to the ever-growing demand for decent, affordable hous-
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 In recent decades, a large scholarly literature has documented the 
expanded privatization of public services.248 As is common knowledge, 
private entities control access to electricity,249 water,250 and the Inter-
net.251 Private entities also run prison facilities,252 police forces,253 and 
national security operations.254 David Sklansky has aptly described 
the ubiquity of private forces: 
Uniformed private officers guard and patrol office buildings, facto-
ries, warehouses, schools, sports facilities, concert halls, train sta-
tions, airports, shipyards, shopping centers, parks, government fa-
cilities—and, increasingly, residential neighborhoods. On any giv-
en day, many Americans are already far more likely to encounter a 
security guard than a police officer . . . .  
 . . . .  
 . . . [G]overnment agencies are hiring private security personnel 
to guard and patrol government buildings, housing projects, and 
public parks and facilities, and a small but growing number of lo-
cal governments have begun to experiment with broader use of 
private police.255 
As private entities increasingly take over common public functions, 
their power over ordinary people grows.  
                                                                                                                                       
ing, landlords hold increased power over whom they rent to and under what circumstances. 
As a result of this power imbalance, many tenants are subjected to sexual harassment by 
housing providers and their agents.”).  
 248. See Metzger, supra note 11, at 1371-73 (highlighting the “new reality of privatized 
government” and collecting related literature). 
 249. Cf. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (ruling that utility ser-
vices are “not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State”). 
 250. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States: Hu-
man Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 785, 791-93 (2009) (describing the trend of privatizing water). 
 251. See Jim Dwyer, For Those in the Digital Dark, Enlightenment is Borrowed  
from the Library, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014, at A17, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/nyregion/for-those-in-the-digital-dark-enlightenment-
is-borrowed-from-the-library-.html?_r=0 (“For most of the city, two companies, Time Warn-
er and Verizon, provide broadband access, at an annual cost of close to $1,000 per home. 
For many houses, that means no access at all.”); see also Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk 
Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1298-1306 (1998) (describing the development of private trade-
mark rights with respect to domain names). 
 252. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2002). 
 253. See generally Sklansky, supra note 239 (describing the private security industry). 
 254. See Jonathan Fahey & Adam Goldman, NSA Leak Highlights Key Role  
of Private Contractors, HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2013, 11:00 PM),  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/10/nsa-leak-contractors_n_3418876.html; see also 
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 992-93 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (describing wiretap-
ping by AT&T Corporation).  
 255. Sklansky, supra note 238, at 1175-77 (footnote omitted). 
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 Given the scope of private control and potential for private abuses 
of power, it is unclear whether the presence of a government adver-
sary should be the indicator of a need for counsel. For many people, 
the influence that private parties exert over their lives is as ubiqui-
tous and significant as that exerted by the State. Relatedly, where 
there are imbalances between ordinary people and the private actors 
that control vital resources, the role of the State is not necessarily as 
the adversary of the people but may be as their protector. In these 
contexts, the lawyer might serve not to thwart the State but to assist it. 
B.  The State as Regulator of Private Power 
 If we tend to discount the danger of private power, it may be be-
cause we focus so intently on the State as the danger. The dangers of 
State power inform the very structure of the U.S. government’s de-
sign.256 Yet the State is not only a danger. In the natural world and 
the market, power inequalities exist between private parties, and one 
role of the State is to protect the less powerful. The design of our gov-
ernment also reflects this protective purpose.257  
 A core function of government is to provide collectively that which 
individuals cannot obtain on their own.258 This includes creating and 
enforcing rules of the road for interactions between private parties. 
While government agents must be checked to prevent abuse of power, 
they must also be strong enough to check private actors from abusing 
one another.259  
 As legislator, adjudicator, and enforcer, the State can support and 
limit the conduct of private parties to equalize power imbalances that 
would exist in the natural world.260 The State can prevent private 
parties from using their physical and economic power in ways that 
could lead to unjust harm or chaos. The State can also offer fora for 
the peaceful and just resolution of disputes.261 
                                                                                                                                       
 256. See Griffiths, supra note 13, at 380-81. 
 257. See Fiss, supra note 149, at 788 (“The purpose of the state is not to supplant the 
market (as it would under a socialist theory), nor to perfect the market (as it would under a 
theory of market failure), but rather to supplement it.”). 
 258. See MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE 8-12 (2010).  
 259. See Fiss, supra note 149, at 781-83 (describing efforts to limit state power and 
advocating for “the necessity of an activist state”). 
 260. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in 
the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 7 (2008). 
 261. The role of the State permeates all civil and criminal proceedings, from creating 
and maintaining the governing laws to adjudicating and enforcing them. In the criminal 
proceeding, the State serves as prosecutor and judge, but even in cases between two pri-
vate parties, the State plays a role. As just one example, if a landlord brings a successful 
eviction proceeding against a tenant, a judge issues the judgment of possession, and it is 
the marshal or sheriff, not the landlord, who will forcibly remove the tenant if she attempts 
to remain on the premises after that judgment. Although the state action doctrine has 
sought to distinguish between levels of state involvement, scholars have demonstrated the 
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 Governmental actors routinely mediate power imbalances be-
tween private parties through the passage of legislation. The Fair 
Labor Standards Act prevents employers from pressuring employees 
to accept pay rates below a set minimum.262 Consumer protection 
laws prevent sellers from engaging in fraud or deception.263 Environ-
mental statutes protect the public’s supply of clean water by restrict-
ing the actions of private actors who would pollute it.264 Housing 
statutes prevent landlords from arbitrarily ejecting tenants from 
their homes.265 Indeed, legislation limits private actors’ imposition of 
collateral consequences after criminal convictions266 and civil judg-
ments.267 It affirmatively promotes access to employment and hous-
ing by prohibiting discrimination against protected classes268 and 
against persons with criminal records269 or eviction histories.270  
 The State is more than a criminal prosecutor, and the justice sys-
tem includes more than the criminal justice system. Lawyers have a 
role not only in checking State power, but also in helping people to 
obtain State support and helping to enforce the State’s regulation of 
power inequalities between private parties.  
                                                                                                                                       
inherent difficulty with resting rights on such a project. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethink-
ing State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505-07 (1985) (arguing that the state action re-
quirement is incoherent and undesirable and should be abandoned); Metzger, supra note 
11, at 1371-73 n.6-10 (collecting literature on the state action doctrine). 
 262. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). 
 263. See generally COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, OTHER 
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS AND REGULATIONS (2009), available at http://www.occ.gov/ 
publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/other.pdf, for a summary of fed-
eral consumer protection laws. 
 264. See generally DAVID M. BEARDEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS: SUMMARIES OF MAJOR STATUTES ADMINISTERED BY THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
RL30798.pdf, for a summary of federal environmental laws. 
 265. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL. PROP. ACTS. LAW § 853 (McKinney 2014) (providing right of 
action to challenge forcible or unlawful exclusion from property). 
 266. See King, supra note 56, at 47 n.273 (listing state legislation prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination against persons with criminal convictions).  
 267. E.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-807 to -811 (2014) (providing protections against 
tenant blacklisting); see Proposed State Legislation Would Safeguard Tenants’ Rights in 
Foreclosure, 40 HOUSING L. BULL. 131, 134 (2010) (listing state legislation that requires 
sealing of eviction records). 
 268. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (prohibiting housing discrimination).  
 269. See King, supra note 56, at 47 n.273. 
 270. § 3604. 
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V.  ROLE OF LAWYER 
 How well the State regulates power imbalances between private 
parties depends in part on the distribution of lawyers.271 Many cate-
gories of civil laws are underenforced because of the unavailability of 
counsel to represent the individuals with claims.272 At the same time, 
other categories are overenforced because, routinely, plaintiffs retain 
counsel while defendants cannot.273 The imbalance in representation 
has the potential to stymie the protection of individual rights and 
also to thwart the rule of law.274 Part V will explore the roles that 
counsel can serve to protect the rule of law and to promote their cli-
ents’ equal participation in and access to the fruits of civil society.  
A.  Protector of Rule of Law and Check on Use of Force 
 The classic rationale for the appointment of criminal defense 
counsel is that her participation is essential to protect procedural and 
substantive legal rights against governmental overreach or abuse.275 
The U.S. Constitution supplies the criminal defendant with a handful 
of protections from the State, but she needs a lawyer to bring them to 
life.276 She cannot invoke her rights without legal assistance. Lawyers 
serve to ensure that clients’ rights are protected and the rule of law is 
maintained. 277 
                                                                                                                                       
 271. See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-
Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 213 (2003) (arguing that hobbling advocates un-
dermines the legitimacy of the adversary system). 
 272. See Vladeck, supra note 216, at 284-86.  
 273. See supra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.  
 274. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 8, at 113; Fiss, supra note 164, at 1085; 
Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
803, 830-32 (2009); see also Complaint at 1, People v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 
BC508466, 2013 WL 1915821 (L.A. Cnty., Cal. Super. Ct. May 9, 2013) (describing “mas-
sive debt collection mill” whereby JPMorgan “flooded . . . courts with collection lawsuits 
against defaulted credit card borrowers based on patently insufficient evidence—betting 
that borrowers would lack the resources or legal sophistication to call Defendants’ bluff”), 
available at http://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/Complaint_0.pdf?; 
Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-
Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 259, 262 (2011) (de-
scribing widespread consumer abuse resulting from the “debt buyer litigation  
model . . . characterized by a sophisticated business represented by a skilled lawyer suing 
an unsophisticated, unrepresented consumer in which no formal rules of evidence are ap-
plied, and rank hearsay is rampant”). 
 275. See Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1114 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing); see also Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 542 (1977) (“[P]rofessional critics are necessary to check government  
misconduct.”). 
 276. See Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1107 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 653-54 
(1984)). 
 277. See Weissman, supra note 148, at 743-49 (describing the role of lawyers in protect-
ing the rule of law). 
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 The violation of an individual’s rights threatens the stability of 
democratic society more broadly. If the process is not maintained in 
one case, deterrence of bad conduct may be diminished. A lawyer not 
only protects the client from having improperly seized evidence used 
at trial but also protects the citizenry from a world in which improper 
seizures are commonplace. The recognized need for counsel reflects a 
suspicion that the State would abuse its power and violate the rights 
of the people if not for vigilant guardians to protect them.278 The law-
yer’s obligation is to defend the integrity of the process.279 By safe-
guarding the safeguards, the lawyer serves to ensure a society gov-
erned by the rule of law rather than the rule of might.  
 The lawyer also protects the client’s substantive rights. She pro-
tects the otherwise vulnerable client from a harsh outcome.280 She 
wards off the State’s use of force, preventing, mitigating, or at least 
delaying it.281 A major impetus for the structure of the adversarial 
trial, and the role of the criminal defense lawyer within it, is to cre-
ate a barrier between the individual and the coercive force of the 
State.282 The lawyer serves not only as the guarantor of fair play but, 
more fundamentally, as the buffer between the client and the State’s 
acts of force.283  
 If criminal defense lawyers safeguard rights and the rule of law,284 
lawyers in the civil context serve a comparable function. Lawyers 
representing civil defendants ensure that substantive and procedural 
laws are maintained and protect civil defendants against plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                                       
 278. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).  
 279. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 22 
(2002). 
 280. Note the nexus between the private interests at stake and the identity of the ad-
versary. The criminal defense lawyer serves to keep the State from imposing imprisonment 
or death. See supra Part II.A. 
 281. See LUBAN, supra note 203, at 62 (describing the criminal adversarial process and 
the lawyer’s role within it as creating an obstacle course for the State); see also Packer, 
supra note 115, at 13 (“If the Crime Control Model resembles an assembly line, the Due 
Process Model looks very much like an obstacle course. Each of its successive stages is de-
signed to present formidable impediments to carrying the accused any further along in the 
process.”). 
 282. See Griffiths, supra note 13, at 387 (“The defendant’s interest is only to resist the 
imposition on himself of any State power.”). 
 283. See Natapoff, supra note 155, at 1352 (“[T]he focus on punishment and cost omits 
other core values served by criminal adjudication—the standard ones being legality, evi-
dentiary accuracy, and fair process.”). 
 284. Some scholars have challenged the portrait of lawyers safeguarding rights and the 
rule of law. See, e.g., Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49  
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 489-94 (2007). Particularly given the predominance of pleas ra-
ther than trials, this portrait may be viewed as romantic more than real. See Natapoff, 
supra note 201, at 1066-70. However, others have responded that, particularly in a climate 
of bargains influenced more by the power of the adversary than the shadow of the law, the 
presence of counsel is as critical as ever for combatting that power. See Bowers, supra note 
162, at 1142-44, 1150. 
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who would use the public courts to impose their will. For example, 
the tenant’s attorney in an eviction case checks whether the basis for 
the proceeding is meritorious, as opposed to a careless error, an act of 
retaliation, or mere exertion of will. The lawyer defends by using the 
tools at his or her disposal to check the system.  
 In both criminal and civil contexts, if the civil plaintiff or criminal 
prosecutor short-circuits the process, the defense lawyer can chal-
lenge the violation of law. If police officers seize evidence without a 
warrant or exception, criminal defense counsel can move to have the 
evidence excluded. If a landlord ejects a tenant from a home without 
a judgment of possession, the tenant’s lawyer can challenge this ex-
tralegal use of force.  
 Lawyers check not only physical but also economic power. Eco-
nomic power plays a significant role in ordinary life,285 and civil law-
yers have an important role to play in protecting against its unbri-
dled application. Numerous laws serve to check the abuse of econom-
ic power,286 and such laws are not self-enforcing: they tend to be com-
plex and require lawyers’ assistance.287 Lawyers can counterbalance 
inequalities of power between private actors. They can prevent pri-
vate actors with greater economic power from abusing those with 
less. In so doing, they not only maintain the rule of law but also pro-
tect the dignity of the economically weaker members of society.288  
B.  Lawyering for Justice Beyond the Civil-Criminal Divide 
 The communities of persons unable to afford counsel in civil and 
criminal proceedings overlap substantially. Both are disproportion-
ately poor people of color, and their criminal justice and civil justice 
needs are interrelated.289 Lawyers have a role to play in supporting 
                                                                                                                                       
 285. See supra notes 239-44, 248-51 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra Part IV. 
 287. It is for this reason that many of the laws protecting against private abuses of 
power specifically provide for the loser to pay attorneys’ fees when plaintiffs prevail. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012); S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910 (1976) (“[I]f those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are 
not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it 
costs them to vindicate these rights in court.”); see also Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money 
Got to Do with It? Public Interest Lawyering and Profit, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 465-71, 
488-92 (2014) (arguing that litigation pursuant to fee-shifting statutes is a form of public 
interest lawyering). 
 288. See FREEDMAN, supra note 115, at 24 (“[Z]ealous and effective advocacy is essen-
tial to the adversary system, . . . a precious safeguard that any one of us may have occasion 
to call upon if we should come to need our own champion against a hostile world.”). For a 
common portrait of criminal defense attorneys protecting individual dignity, see also Smith 
supra note 225, at 1210 (“Defenders uphold the political philosophy underlying the Ameri-
can system of justice and safeguard the dignity of each member of society no matter how 
low he or she has fallen.”). 
 289. The key difference between the populations may be one of gender: most civil legal 
services clients are female, while most clients of appointed criminal defense counsel are 
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their clients’ equal participation in, and access to the resources of, 
civil society. The prioritization of criminal over civil counsel exagger-
ates the divide between the functions these lawyers serve and ne-
glects the significance of accessing economic and political resources 
for both client populations. Further, it falsely suggests that the most 
valuable work of a lawyer is to ward off the intrusion of regulation, 
rather than to support its robust and equal application.290  
 In the criminal case, the best outcome from the perspective of the 
individual appears, at least at first blush, to be freedom from State 
interference.291 In the civil case, sometimes the best outcome may be 
framed as freedom from State interference, but other times it can be 
access to basic economic necessities, freedom from discrimination, or 
                                                                                                                                       
male. Compare LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BY THE NUMBERS: THE 
DATA UNDERLYING LEGAL AID PROGRAMS 25 (2013), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/LSC/LSC2013BTN.pdf (71.2% of clients of civil legal aid offices supported by 
Legal Services Corporation were female); Bezdek, supra note 114, at 535, 540 nn.21-22 
(observing that 71% of the defendant tenants in Baltimore were female and 87% were 
black, while 13% were white); see also Steven Gunn, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: 
Costly Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 393 (1995) (finding 
that in New Haven, Connecticut, nearly 80% of the defendant tenants in eviction cases 
were women); Ken Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction 
Proceedings in New York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 534 (1991) (asserting that in 
New York, two-thirds of defendant tenants in the housing court are single women), with 
THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS 
IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at 31 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf (82.4% of felony defendants were male in 75 of the largest pop-
ulation counties in the U.S.); David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: 
Using Random Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 
1162 (2007) (81% of clients of public defender’s office were male). While beyond the scope of 
this Article, the gender gap in treatment of the two populations provides yet another rea-
son to interrogate more carefully the valuation of criminal over civil counsel. See LISA 
ADDARIO, NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN & THE LAW, GETTING A FOOT IN THE DOOR: WOMEN, CIVIL 
LEGAL AID AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1998), available at http://docs.escr-
net.org/usr_doc/Lisa_Addario_-_footinthedoor_e.pdf; Mary Jane Mossman, Gender Equality 
and Legal Aid Services: A Research Agenda for Institutional Change, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 30, 
46 (1993) (highlighting gender inequality in prioritizing criminal defense over civil repre-
sentation). Compare OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 55 (2012), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2013-APP.pdf (annual federal 
funding for Federal Defenders Services was approximately $1,063,517,000), with id. at 
1355 (annual federal funding for indigent civil legal services was approximately 
$402,000,000). 
 290. See ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF 
PROFESSIONALISM 112 (2013) (“If a lawyer is an admirable person and in an admirable 
profession, then it cannot possibly be by virtue of his or her association with lawmakers; it 
must rather be by virtue of having helped someone victimized by lawmakers ward off the 
effect of silly, misguided, overly invasive, stupidly or wrongly misapplied law.”); id. at 111 
(describing a portrait of legislation as “an unwarranted bureaucratic intrusion on what 
would otherwise be either a ruggedly individualistic or a bucolic communitarian  
existence”). 
 291. See Packer, supra note 115, at 2-3. But see generally Nicole Martorano Van Cleve, 
Reinterpreting the Zealous Advocate: Multiple Intermediate Roles of the Criminal Defense 
Attorney, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 293 (Leslie C. 
Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (describing other goals of zealous advocacy). 
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the security of various other interests. In the criminal proceeding, the 
goal is to limit the State’s use of force; in the civil proceeding, some-
times it may also be to limit such force, but other times it can be to 
utilize the power of the law to protect against other forms of extrale-
gal force. When we assume that the outcomes at stake in the criminal 
proceeding are necessarily weightier, we suggest that what we most 
want from the State is to be left alone. The right to be left alone, this 
perspective tells us, is necessarily more valuable and worthy of pro-
tection than any other right.292 
 The prioritization of the right to be left alone has limits. As schol-
ars writing in the area of criminal justice have begun to highlight, 
formal procedural justice in the courtroom may not be what criminal 
defendants need most. Criminal defendants function in a broader so-
cial context. A fair and equal justice system requires not only repre-
sentation in individual proceedings but also institutional work on 
social welfare policies.293 The lawyer may be most effective when 
working in these other arenas.294 
 The role of the lawyer, both criminal and civil, is not only to pro-
tect the individual from intrusions by the State but also to obtain 
State support. This can take the form of helping people stay out of 
the criminal justice system or advocating for them when they re-
enter civil society. It might mean pursuing housing subsidies, educa-
tional programs, or job training, while also lobbying for statutes to 
prohibit employers, landlords, and lenders from discriminating 
against persons with convictions. Just as traditional criminal defense 
lawyering seeks to equalize power, so do these kinds of activities: 
they seek to equalize economic access and participation in civic life.  
 In many cases, such lawyering is at least as important as repre-
sentation in criminal proceedings. The availability of legal counsel to 
improve access to housing and employment could ultimately have a 
larger impact on criminal defendants, individually and in the aggre-
gate—including both actual defendants and potential defendants—
than counsel in criminal proceedings. Scholars have posited that af-
firmative legal services might more fundamentally change the struc-
                                                                                                                                       
 292. Yet, even in the criminal context, the logic of this prioritization breaks down. The 
right to be left alone requires assistance for its enforcement. In criminal defense, the right 
to be left alone depends on the safeguards of the rule of law, which, in turn, depend on the 
availability of counsel. Before the State leaves the individual alone, the State must provide 
her with counsel to support her rights. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-
Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 
1148 (2011). 
 293. See Natapoff, supra note 200, at 1075-76. 
 294. See Robin Steinberg, Heeding Gideon’s Call in the Twenty-First Century: Holistic 
Defense and the New Public Defense Paradigm, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 961, 962-63, 975-
77, 989-1000 (2013). 
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ture of society than defensive representation,295 and today this may 
be increasingly the case.296 
C.  Affirmative Lawyering 
 Advocates of a right to civil counsel have achieved important vic-
tories in areas of defensive lawyering, but increasing the availability 
of affirmative lawyering ought also to be a priority. Checking eco-
nomic abuse often involves affirmative litigation.297 In the void left by 
the Supreme Court, a healthy number of state and local governments 
have stepped in to provide counsel in civil proceedings,298 but most 
have focused on counsel for civil defendants. This focus recognizes 
that the State ought not to drag people into court without providing 
guidance in the process. Yet the emphasis on defensive lawyering 
discounts the importance of lawyers’ role in affirmatively enforcing 
limits on the abuse of power. The appointment of counsel to represent 
civil defendants will not be sufficient to check the power of private 
actors. Beyond reactive lawyering, counsel must protect people 
through proactive efforts.  
 Admittedly, defining the limit for appointment of counsel might be 
more complex if the right extended beyond named defendants to 
plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs, but at least one initial step is 
available. A modest method of increasing the availability of counsel 
in affirmative litigation would be to shore up already-existing legisla-
tion that, in certain categories of cases, approves payment of prevail-
ing plaintiffs’ attorneys, using funds from losing defendants. In con-
trast to the general rule that each party pays the costs of hiring civil 
counsel,299 Congress has passed more than 150 laws authorizing the 
shifting of fee payments from defendants to prevailing plaintiffs in a 
defined category of cases—including unpaid wages, housing discrimi-
nation, consumers’ rights, and environmental protections, among 
                                                                                                                                       
 295. See Gary Blasi, Framing Access to Justice: Beyond Perceived Justice for Individu-
als, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 913, 930 (2009); see also Robert Lefcourt, Lawyers for the Poor 
Can’t Win, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE 123, 130, 134 (1971) (arguing that subsidized de-
fense lawyers legitimize the enforcement of poor people’s obligations).  
 296. See supra notes 152-62, 184-85 and accompanying text (highlighting the increas-
ing importance of collateral consequences); see also supra notes 248-55 (highlighting in-
creasing private control over delivery of previously public services). 
 297. See Blasi, supra note 295 (framing access to justice to include affirmative litiga-
tion and non-litigation activities). Affirmative representation might do more than defensive 
representation to shift, or at least check the abuse of, power. See Lefcourt, supra note 295.  
 298. See supra note 13. 
 299. See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsi-
dies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2119, 2130-37 (2000) (highlighting “unaided access” as a premise of the U.S. civil 
justice system).  
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others.300 These statutes support the work of counsel who represent 
persons unable to pay the lawyers themselves. Fee-shifting statutes 
remain technically in force today, but the Supreme Court has sharply 
narrowed their effects, by approving tactics that avoid defendants’ 
obligation to cover the costs of plaintiffs’ counsel.301 Relatively 
straightforward legislation could counteract the Court’s decisions and 
strengthen the existing mechanisms for payment of plaintiffs’ counsel.302  
 Although enhanced fee-shifting legislation is not a complete solu-
tion to expanding the availability of counsel, this approach offers im-
portant advantages. First, given that it would build on existing legis-
lation, it does not require further debates on the substance of the leg-
islation: it would simply improve the payment provisions in the areas 
already recognized for their public importance.303 Second, this ap-
proach draws on market mechanisms and does not require any addi-
tional government expenditures. This may be crucial in a time of 
budget cuts. Finally, the number of relevant statutes means that 
strengthening these seemingly minor provisions could provide coun-
sel for quite a large number of people.  
 This approach to the unavailability of counsel has received less 
attention from advocates of a right to civil counsel, who have focused 
largely on State-funded solutions. In addition to directly funding rep-
resentation, however, the State can also serve the function of enact-
ing legislation that supplements the market. While the direct fund-
ing model may work well for defensive lawyering, the supplemental 
approach may be more effective for affirmative work. As discussed 
above, providing counsel for affirmative matters is particularly im-
portant in combatting abuses of private power. As scholars and poli-
cymakers continue to debate if and when civil counsel should be ap-
                                                                                                                                       
 300. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012); see also Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Appendix) (collecting federal statutory fee-shifting  
provisions).  
 301. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia, 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) 
(ruling that serving as a catalyst for change in a defendant’s behavior is not sufficient to 
obtain payment for lawyers); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 728 (1986) (ruling that de-
fendants may condition a settlement for full injunctive relief on waiver of all fees for plain-
tiffs’ counsel); Marek, 473 U.S. at 10 (holding that a Rule 68 offer of judgment could cut off 
entitlement to fees); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The 
Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291 (1990); Samuel R. Ba-
genstos, Thurgood Marshall, Meet Adam Smith: How Fee-Shifting Statutes Provide a Mar-
ket-Based System for Promoting Access to Justice (Though Some Judges Don’t Get It) 4-5 
(Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 09-06-01, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407275. 
 302. I hesitate even to reference a legislative solution, as I do not want to distract from 
the broader point regarding the vital role of lawyers checking private power. My intention 
in this Article is to serve as a legal critic, not a reformer. See WEST, supra note 291, at 160-
62 (distinguishing legal critic from legal reformer).  
 303. For a more detailed argument that litigation pursuant to fee-shifting statutes is a 
form of public interest lawyering, see Sabbeth, supra note 287, at 488-92. 
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pointed, increased attention should be devoted to private power and 
the role of lawyers who check it. 
CONCLUSION 
 This Article sought to make two unique contributions to the litera-
ture on the role of counsel. First, it brought together different bodies 
of research that had not previously been in dialogue: literature on the 
right to counsel in civil proceedings and studies of the civil collateral 
consequences of criminal convictions. The Supreme Court has joined 
criminal justice scholars in taking note of the growth of collateral 
consequences and of the need for criminal defense attorneys to advise 
clients accordingly. This Article observed that recognition of the need 
for counsel to protect clients against civil consequences of criminal 
convictions—for example consequences for employment, housing, or 
immigration status—may underscore an equal or greater need for 
counsel in the proceedings that address those civil interests directly. 
Additionally, social science research demonstrates that civil judg-
ments, not only criminal convictions, result in collateral consequenc-
es. Given the economic exclusion and social stigma that can flow from 
civil judgments, any valuation of the interests that civil lawyers pro-
tect should account for these collateral consequences. 
 Moving beyond the individual private interests at stake in civil and 
criminal proceedings, the second, and more fundamental, contribution of 
this Article concerns the function of lawyers as a check on the excesses of 
power. This Article argued that the prioritization of criminal defense 
counsel reflects a preoccupation with the dangers of State power and a 
corresponding disregard for the dangers of private power. The prioritiza-
tion of criminal over civil counsel assumes that the most valuable work of 
a lawyer is to ward off the intrusion of the State. Yet this portrait of the 
State as overly intrusive and lawyers as anti-regulation bulwarks is flawed.  
 Private actors control access to many of the basic resources essen-
tial for life and participation in democratic society—food, shelter, 
medicine, information, communication, and physical safety. The ac-
tors who control such access enjoy tremendous power over the indi-
viduals who depend on it. A function of the State is to protect against 
the abuse of such power through legislation and adjudication. Law-
yers can serve as shields against State power, but they can also sup-
port the just and equal application of the State’s laws. Lawyers serve 
a vital role in checking the power of private actors. Proponents of a 
civil right to counsel might consider devoting increased attention to 
lawyering against private parties. As private actors increasingly take 
over public functions, their power over the lives of ordinary people 
grows, and the need for lawyers to check that power intensifies. 
